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Abstract 
With the passage of the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1956, the interstate system included an 
elevated segment of Interstate 10 constructed over Claiborne Avenue in New Orleans, Louisiana.  
The I-10 Claiborne Expressway provided access to downtown by destroying a tree-lined 
boulevard and contributing to the decline of an African American neighborhood.  In 2005, after 
hurricane Katrina, several community-based plans proposed that the elevated I-10 Claiborne 
Expressway be removed.  This thesis compares the removal proposals to the decision making 
processes of five case cities that have removed expressways. Necessary conditions were applied 
to all expressway removal cases.  Currently, the I-10 Claiborne Expressway decision making 
process lacks defined structural integrity and safety concerns, a reduction in the value of 
freeways by power brokers, documented support of the business community and “selling” of idea 
by a public agency. These conditions were necessary to the decision to remove expressways in 
all case cities.        
 
Freeway removal, elevated freeway demolition, Interstate 10, Claiborne Avenue, New Orleans, 
deconstructing  elevated  highways 
 
 
  
 
 
1 
Introduction 
In the aftermath of the devastation of Hurricane Katrina that began on August 29, 2005, a flurry 
of city-wide, community-based, planning activities commenced in each of 13 planning districts 
recognized by the New Orleans City Planning Commission.   During the post-Katrina planning 
process, the residents of Planning District 4 proposed that a study be initiated to evaluate the 
removal of the elevated segment of Interstate 10 above Claiborne Avenue (I-10 Claiborne 
Expressway).  The demolition or removal proposals vary, but basically, involve a 2 mile segment 
of the elevated interstate from Elysian Fields to Tulane Avenue (or Canal Street) and 8 to 12 
associated ramps. 
Source: Google Maps, Edited by author using Scribblemaps.com 
Figure 1 New Orleans Interstate System with Major Street Names 
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The purpose of this study is to explore the proposed demolition of the elevated highway segment, 
I-10 Claiborne Expressway in New Orleans, Louisiana by comparing the New Orleans case to 
the experiences of selected case cities that have completed a demolition, removal or 
deconstruction of elevated interstate highway segments.    In my research, I will explore the 
proposals to demolish the I-10 Claiborne Expressway in New Orleans and compare the New 
Orleans case to the selected case cities.  This comparative analysis will be based on relevant 
theory from existing literature detailing the circumstances under which demolition occurs.  It is 
my hypothesis that freeway removal will only take place in New Orleans when the necessary 
conditions common to the case cities are present in the I-10 Claiborne Expressway decision 
making process. 
My research questions are as follows: 
 What are the necessary conditions that yield a decision to remove urban elevated 
expressways? 
 What are the dynamics of the decision making process for I-10 Claiborne Expressway?  
 Based on experiences of other cities, is the removal of the I-10 Claiborne Expressway 
feasible? 
In New Orleans prior to Hurricane Katrina, the planning literature was limited relative to 
proposals to demolish or deconstruct the elevated I-10 Claiborne Expressway.  Most of the 
previous studies are limited to beautification proposals or critical reviews of the impacted 
community, and rarely question the continued existence of the elevated I-10 Claiborne 
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Expressway structure.  My research will attempt to broaden the literature on the demolition 
alternative of the elevated I-10 Claiborne Expressway.  
The demolition proposal for the I-10 Claiborne Expressway was captured in the New Orleans 
Neighborhood Revitalization Plans (also known as Lambert Plans) in 2006.  A similar proposal 
was included in the 2007 Unified New Orleans Plan (also known as UNOP) for Planning District 
4.  Both the Lambert and UNOP plans recommend that funding be provided for an initial study 
of the proposal to remove I-10 Claiborne Expressway. (Lambert Advisory LLC; Zyscovich, Inc.; 
Cliff James; Byron Stewart, 2006; Frederic Schwartz Architects; Eskew+Dumez+Ripple; HOK; 
Wayne Troyer Architects; New Orleans Community Support Foundation, 2007).   
Additionally, the Congress for New Urbanism (CNU) ranked the I-10 Claiborne Expressway. 
fifth out of ten “freeways without futures”.  These were urban freeways that have the 
“opportunity to stimulate valuable revitalization by replacing the aging urban highways with 
boulevards and other cost-saving alternatives” (Congress for the New Urbanism).  The CNU is a 
Chicago based, national organization that promotes walkable neighborhoods (Cohen, 2008). 
In September 2009, a proposal to study the feasibility of replacing the I-10 Claiborne 
Expressway with a tree-lined at-grade boulevard was presented in the draft of the  City of New 
Orleans Master Plan entitled Plan for the 21
st
 Century New Orleans 2030.  The Master Plan for 
the City of New Orleans will have the force of law as a result of a city charter change approved 
by the citizens of New Orleans in November of 2008.  This charter change requires that the city 
develop a master plan and that land use actions be consistent with the master plan. 
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It has been theorized in the UNOP that the demolition of I-10 Claiborne Expressway would yield 
“positive impacts by reconnecting neighborhoods and restoring what was once a beautiful tree 
lined avenue” and that “traffic redistribution provides economic development benefit to a 
corridor ripe for more volume.” (Frederic Schwartz Architects; Eskew+Dumez+Ripple; HOK; 
Wayne Troyer Architects; New Orleans Community Support Foundation, 2007, p. 62).   
The draft New Orleans Master Plan theorizes that the I-10 removal would “right a decades old 
wrong committed in the name of urban renewal, …enhance the liveability and character of 
adjacent neighborhoods…and promote investment in the neglected  blocks along the 
expressway” (Goody Clancy, Camiros Ltd, GCR Inc, Maning Architects , 2009).  All plans 
acknowledge the concerns associated with diverting traffic from I-10 to I-610 as shown in the 
Figure 1. 
This thesis begins with a brief history of the interstate system in the United States, New Orleans 
and more specifically the I-10 Claiborne Expressway.   Chapter 2 explores the origins of the 
proposals to remove the elevated I-10 segment.  In Chapter 3 and 4, the federal and local policy 
implications and planning impacts are discussed relative to the future of Interstate 10.  Chapter 5 
presents the theory and conditions that are the basis for this research and Chapter 6 addresses 
methodology for my research.  Chapters 7 through 11 are case summaries of the five cases cities 
that have completed demolition or removal of an elevated interstate segment.  Chapter 12 is a 
cross case analysis of the cases cities and the proposal to demolish the elevated segment of I-10 
Claiborne Expressway.  This thesis concludes with limitations of research and responses to 
research questions.
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Chapter 1 – Historical Perspective of the Interstate System 
United States Interstate System 
The very early planning for the interstate system in America began with the Federal Aid 
Act of 1938 under the direction of Thomas McDonald who would serve as Chief of the 
Bureau of Public Roads (BPR) from 1919 to 1953 (McNichol, 2003, p. 59).  The BPR 
was the precursor agency to the U.S. Department of Transportation which was 
established 1967.  The 1938 act allocated funds for 46 states to conduct highway 
planning surveys of their roads.  The survey results were published in a highway planning 
report entitled Toll Roads and Free Roads presented to Congress in 1939 (Weingroff, 
Highway History, 2008).   
Another early planning document for the US interstate system was entitled Inter-regional 
Highways was presented to Congress in 1944.  This report detailed a 33,920 mile network 
of rural and urban highways and provided a section on the principles of route selection.  
Both reports, Toll Roads and Free Roads and Inter-regional Highways contained 
“considerable detail on freeways in cities” (Weingroff, Highway History, 2008) 
The freeway system in America was conceived in large part by highway engineers as 
early as the 1930’s and 1940’s.  In the infant stages and for many years thereafter, the 
planning and construction of freeways and the interstate system was dominated by an 
engineering perspective in a rural or suburban landscape.  President Dwight Eisenhower 
took office in 1953 and shared the perspective that the inner city was no place for the 
interstate. 
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However, Thomas Harris MacDonald, the Chief of the Bureau of Public Roads, fervently 
believed that the rural areas could not justify interstate highways and that the interstate 
must traverse the inner cities.  President Eisenhower did not retain Chief MacDonald 
upon taking office in 1953, but the so called “Yellow Book” created under MacDonald’s 
tenure would become the blueprint for the location of the interstate system in the United 
States.  This document entitled, General Location of National System of Interstate 
Highways included schematics of 122 maps of the proposed highway system in 43 states 
(McNichol, 2003, p. 140).   The Yellow Book was delivered to every member of the 
House and Senate and was instrumental in the passage of the Federal Aid Highway Act 
of 1956.   In the Highway Act 1956, Congress authorized funding for the construction of 
over 41,000 miles of highway funded by the federal government at 90 percent with the 
states accountable for 10 percent (McNichol, 2003, p. 107).  
Although, President Eisenhower never intended for the interstate to traverse the inner 
city, he was unable to do anything about it because of the desire of every congressman 
and senator to bring the federal highway construction projects to their hometown.  Thus, 
the Dwight D. Eisenhower System of Interstate and Defense Highways, named for the 
34
th
 president, went straight through the middle of almost every major urban area in the 
United States.  
The engineers involved in the design of the original interstate system did not adequately account 
for the nuances of the urban landscape in the inner city.  The major American cities are 
comprised of complex spatial and social functions that were not fully considered in the 
alignment, design and construction of the urban freeways.  The construction of expressways in 
the urban areas resulted in the displacement of many poor and minority residents and dismantled 
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many neighborhoods to accommodate freeways often under the guise of urban redevelopment.  
In his book Interstate, Mark Rose summarizes the focus of the interstate construction by stating 
that “traffic patterns of motorists and truckers and decisions of engineers determined the outlines 
of Interstate construction.”    With this focus, engineers intentionally sought out cheap land by 
reviewing city tax maps and targeting the so-called slums for replacement by the interstate.    
Ironically, the interstate highway construction was encouraged by the leadership of many central 
cities that have themselves been adversely impacted by the mass exodus of residents to outlying 
suburban areas and the decentralization of the functions of the central city in favor of locations 
near the interstate interchanges (Muller, 2004).  By 1960, many public officials and businessmen 
were eagerly anticipating the construction of the interstate to increase access to their cities and 
spawn economic development. 
The interstate construction pre-dates and was often the impetus for legislation such as the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1970 that would require a review of the impacts 
to the human and natural environment of all federal funded transportation projects and mandates 
community involvement in the process.     
The construction of the interstate highway system had a significant effect in defining 
Americans preference for automobile travel.   However, there were other notable 
historical events that assisted the highway system in fostering auto dependence in the 
U.S.  These include General Motors systematic buy-out and dismantling of the urban 
light rail systems in over 100 U.S. cities beginning in the 1930s for the purpose of 
eliminating alternate transportation options in favor of selling more cars.  “National City 
Lines, General Motors and the other defendants were found guilty of conspiracy to 
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monopolize the local transportation field” and “were individually fined $5,000.” (Klein, 
1996).  Also, beginning in the mid 1940s, the housing policies of the US Federal Housing 
Administration (FHA) and Veterans Administration (VA) mortgage programs favored 
new construction in the auto accessible suburbs as opposed to the restoration of the inner 
city (Hanchett, 2000).  
The interstate system has shaped the discussion of transportation in the United States and 
has produced many benefits and challenges.  It has been noted that “The interstates 
reduced the cost of transporting goods, provided safe, convenient access for employees 
and shoppers; and helped to increase America’s dependence on the automobile” (Daniels, 
2003, p. 338). 
By the 1960s, several cities were beginning to organize opposition to the interstate 
construction, particularly in urban areas such as San Francisco, Boston, Baltimore and 
New Orleans.  The results were a combination of successful and failed attempts to halt 
interstate construction.  The construction of portions of I-95 in Boston was halted in 
1952; the construction of I-70 in Baltimore was halted in 1968; the construction of I-40 
through Overton Park was halted in 1981, the construction of the New Orleans Riverfront 
Expressway was halted in 1969 and San Francisco stopped construction in progress on 
the Embarcadero and Central freeways in 1959.  However, riots in Detroit (1965) and Los 
Angeles (1965) are attributed in part to the tensions in the poor and minority communities 
when freeways were constructed causing the decline in transit, decreased mobility caused 
by passing over and under freeway structures, and air and noise pollution from vehicular 
traffic.  There was no formal input or representation by the affected poor and minority 
communities in the decision making process for these structures.  
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The proposed interstate systems that became the subject of opposition and controversy in 
the above mentioned cities were generally located in the core of residential areas, in poor 
and minority communities, in business districts and along scenic areas such as waterways 
and parkways.  Elevated expressways are also well represented in the controversial 
discussion of interstate highways particularly given the collapse of two San Francisco 
freeways and one Oakland freeway during the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake.   The full 
impact of the construction of these massive concrete structures is still currently being 
debated in a number of cities. 
Many cities are formally re-evaluating the existence of and need for these elevated 
highways.  Several cities have already opted to dismantle these structures in an attempt to 
correct past errors in design that have adversely impacted the quality of life and increased 
efficiency of traffic flow within these cities.  The removal of elevated expressways has 
been credited with “opening up access to waterfronts, removing physical obstructions, 
and revitalizing economically stagnant neighborhoods.” (Cervero, Kang, & Shively, 
From Elevated Freeways to Surface Boulevards: Neighborhood, Traffic and Housing 
Price Impacts in San Francisco, 2007, p. 2)   
Among the cities that have reconsidered the need for, and value of urban expressways, 
particularly elevated expressways, are Boston, Massachusetts (Central Artery I-93); San 
Francisco, California (Embarcadero Freeway I-480); San Francisco, California (Central 
Freeway I-80), Milwaukee, WI (Park East Freeway I-43) and Portland, Oregon (Harbor 
Drive).   Portland was one of earliest urban cities to demolish an expressway in 1976.  
The Portland Harbor Drive expressway was not elevated but was situated near the 
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Willamette River water front as are many of the interstate segments being evaluated for 
demolition.   
Some of the cities that are actively considering proposals to remove freeways include 
Milwaukee, Wisconsin – Interstate 65; Brooklyn, New York - Gowanus Expressway I-
278, Seattle, Washington - Alaska Way Viaduct; Louisville, Kentucky - Interstate 64 and 
Portland, Oregon - Interstate 5 (The Preservation Institute, 2007).  As evidenced by post-
Katrina community planning reports, New Orleans is also reconsidering the utility of the 
elevated segment of I-10 Claiborne Expressway.   
New Orleans Interstate System 
Entering the city from the west, the interstate system in New Orleans is primarily 
composed of I-10 that runs east and west from Jefferson Parish bending southerly into the 
Pontchartrain Expressway (Exit 230 to Exit 234) followed by a northeasterly bend into 
the North Claiborne Avenue Expressway.   I-10 then continues in an easterly route to 
New Orleans East and the on to Slidell, Louisiana.  Construction of this system was 
largely complete by the mid-1960s.   The Interstate 10 at Claiborne Avenue is a segment 
of the I-10 route that curves similar to river before turning in an east/west direction to 
New Orleans East.  This segment (Exit 234C to Exit 238B in Figure 2) was complete in 
March of 1968 and is the subject of this research.   
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The final portion of the original interstate system is the I-610 which serves as a bypass of 
the Central Business District (CBD) of New Orleans for commuters traveling east or west 
(Exits 1B to 4 in Figure 2).  By 1972, the construction of I-610 was underway; however 
construction was briefly delayed by a class action lawsuit filed on February 24, 1972 
because of its route through City Park (Open Jurist, 2009). 
The interstate system in the New Orleans area developed in much the same manner as the 
US system throughout the country.  Most notably there are two major freeway decisions 
that continue to impact current transportation and land use issues in New Orleans.  One 
Source: South East Roads Website http://www.southeastroads.com/new_orleans.html  
Figure 2 - New Orleans Area Interstate System with Numbered Exits 
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involves the decision to build the I-10 Claiborne Expressway and the other involves the 
decision not to build the interstate on the riverfront in the French Quarters (Lewis, 1997; 
Mohl, The Interstates and the Cities: Highways, Housing and the Freeway Revolt, 2002; 
Mohl, Planned Destruction: Interstates and Central City Housing, 2000; Wright, New 
Orleans Neighborhoods under Seige, 1997).   
Proposed Riverfront Expressway 
In the original interstate designations, New Orleans was to have the I-10 that runs east-
west and loops southerly through the central business district and a bypass of the CBD 
designated as I-610.    However, in 1960, the Riverside Consultant firm issued a report to 
the New Orleans Chamber of Commerce that resulted in a memo being submitted to the 
U.S. Bureau of Public Roads.  The essence of the memo was to appeal for consideration 
of a riverfront expressway in the new interstate system. 
A riverfront expressway, the Vieux Carre Expressway, was originally proposed for the 
City of New Orleans in a 1946 plan by the prominent New York highway builder, Robert 
Moses.  This proposed riverfront expressway was incorporated into the interstate plans of 
the Bureau of Public Roads (BPR) on October 13, 1964 and given the designation of I-
310 (Weingroff, Infrastructure- The Second Battle of New Orleans, Vieux Carre' 
Riverfront Expressway (I-310), 2005).  The historic citizen battle for and against the 
proposed riverfront expressway is captured in the 1981 book entitled, The Second Battle 
of New Orleans by Richard O Baumbach, Jr. and William E. Borah.  Baumbach and 
Borah were major and active opponents of the riverfront expressway. 
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The Louisiana Highway Department (now the Louisiana Department of Transportation 
and Development) proposed the riverfront expressway in January of 1966.  By June of 
1967, the opposition and controversy surrounding the elevated riverfront expressway had 
become so intense that the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) officials, formerly 
the BPR, held a public meeting in New Orleans.  In January of 1969, the LHD, New 
Orleans City Council and the FHWA all approved of a surface expressway with only a 
portion elevated instead of an elevated riverfront expressway. 
The designation of the French Quarter a historic landmark greatly aided the opponents of 
the riverfront expressway.  The passage of the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 
created a process for Federal, State, local officials and historic preservationist to address 
issues of impacting prehistoric and historic resources.  The Act also created the Advisory 
Council for Historic Preservation as a “forum for public consideration of historic 
preservation issues” (Weingroff, Infrastructure- The Second Battle of New Orleans, 
Vieux Carre' Riverfront Expressway (I-310), 2005). 
The Times-Picayune newspaper first reported that the riverfront expressway was no 
longer approved by the FHWA in January 1969 amid lawsuits by preservationist and lack 
of the opportunity for the Advisory Council for Historic Preservation to comment as was 
then required by law.   The new United States Department of Transportation (US DOT) 
was authorized in 1966 and the first secretary was John A. Volpe.  On July 9, 1969, 
Volpe cancelled the Vieux Carre’ Expressway project sighting damage to the French 
Quarter and “separation of the French Quarter from its Mississippi River levee and 
waterfront”.  The I-310 designation of the Vieux Carre’ Expressway was eventually 
reassigned to the Hale Boggs Memorial (Luling) Bridge which opened to traffic in 1983. 
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(Weingroff, Infrastructure- The Second Battle of New Orleans, Vieux Carre' Riverfront 
Expressway (I-310), 2005). 
Planning and Construction of I-10 Claiborne Expressway 
The predominantly “white New Orleans residents” who opposed of the Riverfront 
expressway were ultimately successful in their battle and the highway was never built.  
However, the “nearby mid-city black community along Claiborne Avenue was less 
successful” (Mohl, The Interstates and the Cities: Highways, Housing and the Freeway 
Revolt, 2002, p. 237).  Mohl further contends that the preservationist that fought the 
riverfront expressway were instrumental in offering the Claiborne Avenue corridor as an 
alternate route. 
The I-10 segment over Claiborne Avenue is located in the Treme, Mid-City area of New 
Orleans.  The Treme area is “adjacent to the French Quarter and near the Central 
Business District (CBD) of the City of New Orleans.”  This area is reportedly one of the 
“oldest black neighborhoods in America” (Riker, 2002, p. 3).  Prior to the construction of 
the elevated interstate segment, this area was a  thriving black community and boasted a 
median with oak trees “four stories high” and is said to have been the “longest contiguous 
chain of oaks in the United States” (McNichol, 2003, p. 155).    
The I-10 Claiborne Expressway was not originally the preferred route of the 1946 
Arterial Plan developed by Robert Moses.  The Riverfront Expressway was the 
recommended route as Moses expressed concerns about moving in and out of the core of 
the city.   Moses also favored the proposed Riverfront expressway because it was near the 
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city center, posed no problems with ramps, provided needed light and air and would not 
result in depressing real estate values (Samuels, 2000). 
The planning of the New Orleans interstate is detailed in Daniel Samuels’, thesis research 
entitled Remembering North Claiborne: Community and Place in Downtown New 
Orleans, 2000.  According to Samuel, there were “some nine alternate routes” being 
considered for the expressway through the inner city near the CBD (Samuels, 2000, p. 
60).  By the mid-1950s, the inner city routing of the interstate was becoming a priority 
since the Mississippi River Bridge and Pontchartrain Expressways were constructed and 
the Eastern leg of the interstate was being planned.   
In April of 1954, the Director Secretary of the New Orleans City Planning Commission, 
Louis C. Bisso, presented the 1954 Major Street Plan at a public hearing.  The plan 
contained two expressway routes through the city.  Both routes were located in public 
rights of way eliminating the need for extensive acquisition of privately held land.  These 
routes included a Florida Avenue route as the cross town connection and a North 
Claiborne Avenue to connect New Orleans East to the CBD.  
In 1956, the state of Louisiana developed a report by Howard, Needles, Tammen and 
Bergendoff that proposed a New Orleans interstate alignment similar to the 1955 BPR 
report entitled General Location of National System of Interstate Highways, the infamous 
“Yellow Book”.  The route proposed in the Howard Needles report was very similar to 
the proposed routes in the 1954 Major Street Plan with the exception of a “new right-of-
way to avoid the dogleg in the bend of North Claiborne” (Samuels, 2000, p. 62).     
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 The city and state plans for the interstate in New Orleans were predicated on 
justifications such as projected population growth, increasing vehicle registrations, time 
savings for commuters, elimination of congestion and economic development.  Other 
groups such as the Chamber of Commerce Central Area Committee supported the 
interstate as a tool to “reverse the trend of businesses and people leaving the CBD.”  The 
Chamber collaborated with the Director of CPC, Mr. Bisso, to compile a report entitled A 
Prospectus for Revitalizing New Orleans’ Central Business District in October 1957.  
The plan embraced a concept of inner arterial belt around the CBD with radiating 
arterials connected to outer belts via radiating arterials.  The proposed Claiborne Avenue 
Expressway was an integral part of this plan. 
During a public hearing on February 11, 1958, the audience was hostile and booed R.B 
Richardson the State of Louisiana Director of Highways who was presenting the 
proposed interstate system.  The then Mayor Morrison, reprimanded the audience for its 
behavior and offered comments referring to the city as a “transportation center” that 
under no circumstances should allow the new “interstate system to bypass New Orleans.” 
(Samuels, 2000, p. 67) 
By the late 1950’s the planning of the interstate system in New Orleans was becoming a 
contentious issue among many communities with regard to the logistics of the interstate’s 
route through core of the city. As previously discussed, French Quarter preservationists 
were strongly opposed to the Riverfront Expressway and were successful in its defeat.  
The homeowners in Lakeview and Gentilly were in opposition of a cross town route.  
However, the state and local governments were coalescing with regard to the proposed 
Claiborne Avenue expressway. 
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The North Claiborne Avenue route would be selected for a number of purely logistical 
reasons including its location near the CBD, the wide expanse of its right-of-way capable 
of accommodating an interstate highway, the minimal land acquisitions needed, and the 
US Highway 90 was a state controlled highway.   However, as Samuels states in his 
research, “there is not a single entry in the public record that suggests that North 
Claiborne was conceived by local planning officials in any terms beyond its utility as an 
expressway route.” (Samuels, 2000, p. 70)  The impacts to the surrounding communities 
were rarely mentioned.  It is important to note that in a historical context; the construction 
of the I-10 Claiborne Expressway pre-dates the 1970 NEPA legislation that would 
eventually mandate an extensive public participation process as part of the environmental 
clearance documents required for federally funded transportation projects.  It has been 
stated that “Unlike the hoopla that surrounded proposals for the construction of the 
Riverfront/Vieux Carre’ Freeway, no public hearings were held to inform the black 
community of the Claiborne Avenue section of I-10.” (Wright, New Orleans 
Neighborhoods under Seige, 1997, p. 133) 
The elevated I-10 Claiborne Expressway opened to traffic in March of 1968 (Riker, 2002, 
p. 3).  The final structure is described as “a six lane facility, entirely elevated on a via-
duct structure.  From Gravier Street to St. Bernard Avenue the structure occupies the 
existing median of Claiborne Avenue and from St. Bernard Avenue (and beyond) the 
facility is constructed on a new right of way.  The roadway deck is reinforced concrete, 
cast in place, supported on pre-cast, prestressed AASHO girders or, at long spans, on 
welded, builtup steel girders.  The girders are carried on cast in place 2-column bents, 
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supported on pipe piles.  Column diameters are 3’0” nominal with special bents having 
columns as large as 5’0” diameter.” (Claiborne Avenue Design Team, 1976, p. 43)     
Upon completion of the I-10 Claiborne Expressway, engineers working on the 
construction remarked that it was a “rather grotesque structure” and another stated, “If we 
had it to do over again, we wouldn’t.” (McNichol, 2003, p. 157).  These comments were 
probably some of the earliest of the numerous negative descriptions of the elevated I-10 
structure.  
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Chapter 2 The Proposal to Remove I-10 Claiborne Expressway 
Origins of the I-10 Claiborne Ave Removal Proposal 
The literature on the I-10 Claiborne Expressway and its impact on the culture, sense of place and 
transportation in New Orleans can be divided in to two distinct eras.  Pre-Katrina, the literature is 
primarily focused on the post–construction impacts to the Treme community around the elevated 
structure and recommendations for beautification and improved land use of the space beneath the 
elevated structure.  Post-Katrina the literature is focused on a more radical idea of removing the 
elevated structure and replacing it with a tree-lined surface boulevard as a strategy for economic 
revitalization of the Treme area.   
Pre-Katrina Literature 
The Claiborne Ave Design Team (CADT) I-10 Multi Use Study was conducted in 1976 and 
focused on ways to redevelop the rapidly declining area around the Claiborne Ave I-10 overpass.  
The study area was 3.51 miles of the I-10 corridor from Poydras Street to Peoples Avenue which 
is longer than the current corridor proposed for demolition.  The CADT report is a 
comprehensive plan for redeveloping the area and includes existing conditions including 
environmental issues, historical context of the area, demographic data and proposed design and 
financing strategies.  The CADT recommended alternative included landscaping, street 
improvements, parking facilities, street lighting, street furniture, kiosk and graphics under the 
overpass and the creation of a linear park at the existing railroad site from Basin Street to 
Jefferson Davis Parkway.  The plan recommends removal of off and on ramps between 
Esplanade and St. Phillips Streets and addition of an off ramp at St. Bernard Avenue.  The 
CADT also recommended that the alignment of Claiborne Avenue be relocated under the 
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northside of the elevated I-10 structure from Dumaine to St. Bernard Avenue (Claiborne Avenue 
Design Team, 1976, p. 68 & 109)   
A study on the relationship between community and place in the I-10 Claiborne Expressway 
corridor is the subject of the thesis entitled Remembering North Claiborne: Community and 
Place in Downtown New Orleans, 2000 by Daniel Samuels.   Samuels concludes that policy 
whereby the dynamic between “community and place” are not fully considered will result in the 
affected community bearing a disproportionate share of the “cost of public actions” as is the case 
in the Treme area.  Samuels research provides a detailed look at the planning of the interstate and 
the interstate corridor several decades after the construction of the elevated structure.   He 
focuses on the impact of the Interstate 10 on “community and place” by utilizing “archival 
history and oral history to explore the role of North Claiborne in sustaining the downtown 
community’s viability and identity, and to examine the impacts of the Interstate on those 
relationships.”  (Samuels, 2000, pp. ix-x)  The author presents the historical context of the Treme 
area prior to the construction, the planning process for locating the Interstate and the resulting 
struggle to restore place nearly 50 years after the decision to locate the elevated I-10 on North 
Claiborne Avenue, in the Treme area. 
Samuels research noted that the public record from the beginning of the planning process to 
actual construction of the I-10 contains no information beyond the “utility” of the “expressway 
route” (Samuels, 2000, p. 70).  The research revealed that the affected communities were only 
giving consideration in the context of their “utility to the CBD”.  The author finds that the North 
Claiborne Ave decision makers were influenced by a desire for the City of New Orleans to 
participate in the federally funded urban renewal program.  As such, the goal was to designate 
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the Treme area as a slum and a candidate for renewal by locating the I-10 in the middle of it.  
The considerations of community and place were not explored.  Samuels research addresses 
policy issues as opposed to recommendations involving the physical structure of the elevated 
expressway. 
The May 2002 University of New Orleans Masters of Urban and Regional Planning program 
final project report by Jonathan Riker entitled Overcoming the Impact of Interstate 10: 
Recommendations for Revitalizating North Claiborne Avenue in New Orleans is another pre-
Katrina examination of the impacts of the I-10 Claiborne Ave.  In this final project report, Riker 
examines the current condition of the Treme area adjacent to the elevated I-10 and proposes 
“aesthetic and design recommendations for improving the area such as landscaping, column 
design and public art, highway walls and murals, banners, signage and green space under the 
elevated I-10.  The report contains a section entitled “Measuring the Impacts of I-10 on the Study 
Area” (pps 17-21) that contains demographic, income, social, economic data largely from the 
CADT report.  This report also addresses the “physical destruction” of the area from the taking 
of homes in an eight square block area to facilitate a proposed cultural center.  The Mahalia 
Jackson Theater for Performing Arts was the only building of the multiple buildings planned for 
the center that was actually constructed.  
Post-Katrina Literature 
It is in the post-Katrina literature that the proposals to demolish the elevated segment of the I-10 
Claiborne Expressway begin to appear.  The demolition proposal has appeared in three major 
post-Katrina community planning documents and several newspaper articles. 
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The post-Katrina planning documents that propose to demolish or remove the I-10 Claiborne 
Expressway  are the 2006 New Orleans Neighborhood Revitalization Plans (also known as 
Lambert Plans), the 2007 Unified New Orleans Plan (also known as UNOP), the September 2009 
draft of the  City of New Orleans Master Plan entitled Plan for the 21
st
 Century New Orleans 
2030.  
Lambert Plan - 2006 
The demolition proposal for I-10 at Claiborne was captured in the New Orleans Neighborhood 
Revitalization Plans (also known as Lambert Plan) in 2006.  The Lambert Plan was a citywide, 
community based, post-Katrina planning document that contains 46 neighborhood plans for New 
Orleans.  The plans were funded by the New Orleans City Council using previously unallocated 
Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) funds (NOLAPlans.com, 2006).   
The planning district that included the Treme area and the elevated I-10 Claiborne Ave was 
referrred to as the 6
th
 Ward/Treme/Lafitte Neighborhood (Treme). The Transportation and Public 
Transit section, page 17, of Treme plan presents the communities desire to have an initial study  
and a phased approach to the removal of the interstate.    
The Lambert plan recommends that an initial study be conducted to determine “how the impacts 
of this divisive and destructive elevated roadway can be minimized or eleiminated.”  The plan 
suggests that the construction be phased with ramps such as the  Ursulines Street Ramp being 
removed early due to its limited utility.  The plan then proposes a “directed feasibility study on 
decommisioning” the elevated segment of I-10 “from Canal Street to Elysian Fields.” (Lambert 
Advisory LLC; Zyscovich, Inc.; Cliff James; Byron Stewart, 2006, p. 17).   
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The plan describes the primary issues driving the desire to demolish the elevated segment as 
health and welfare and points to “pollution and debris,” from the roadway,  “acoustical 
pollution” to residents, “vibrations” causing structural cracks, the “antiquated design standards 
for guard rails and access ramps, and “poor drainage”  as considerations for a study.  The 
Lambert Plan further states that should the early studies find that removal is not an option then a 
plan to mitigate impacts is strongly recommended.  However, the Lambert Plan intentionally 
does not offer any specific alternatives to the removal proposal because the I-10 Claiborne 
Expressway is “not a place for people.” (Lambert Advisory LLC; Zyscovich, Inc.; Cliff James; 
Byron Stewart, 2006, p. 18)  
UNOP Plan – 2007 
A similar proposal was included in the 2007 Unified New Orleans Plan (also known as UNOP) 
for Planning District 4.  The UNOP plans were also the result of a city-wide planning effort 
funded by the “Greater New Orleans Foundation (with grants from the Rockefeller Foundation, 
the Bush-Clinton Katrina Fund and GNOF)” (NOLAPlans.com, 2007).  The UNOP developed 
district plans for 13 districts that comprise the City of New Orleans.  Planning District 4 is the 
location of the elevated I-10 Claiborne Expressway. 
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 Source: Frederic Schwartz Architects; Eskew+Dumez+Ripple; HOK; Wayne Troyer Architects; New Orleans Community Support Foundation. 
(2007). UNOP District 4 Recovery Plan. Retrieved from Unified New Orleans Plan: www.unifiedneworleansplan.com 
Figure 3 UNOP Removal Proposal for I-10 Claiborne Expressway 
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The UNOP plan proposed to fund a study and the removal of I-10 Claiborne Expressway from 
Elysian Fields to Tulane Avenue.  The plan describes a “study addressing the transportation, 
housing, economic and cultural impacts and traffic distribution associated with the removal of a 
section of I-10.  The removal of I-10 in Treme would have considerable positive impacts by re-
connecting neighborhoods and restoring what was once a beautiful tree-lined avenue.  Traffic 
redistribution provides economic development benefit to a corridor ripe for more volume.” 
(Frederic Schwartz Architects; Eskew+Dumez+Ripple; HOK; Wayne Troyer Architects; New 
Orleans Community Support Foundation, 2007, p. 64). 
The UNOP plan further proposes a 2 to 5 year timeline for completion of the study and suggests 
that study funding by the U.S. and Louisiana Departments of Transportation and Development.  
The plan proposes that a mix of federal, state and local funding would need to be determined, if 
the removal of I-10 were approved.   The UNOP plan also mentions the need for the study to 
consider traffic rerouting utilizing the existing I-610 and other surface streets.   
New Orleans Master Plan - 2009 
In September 2009, a proposal to study the feasibility of replacing the I-10 Claiborne 
Expressway with a tree-lined at-grade boulevard was presented in the draft of the  City of New 
Orleans Master Plan entitled Plan for the 21
st
 Century New Orleans 2030.  The Master Plan for 
the City of New Orleans will have the force of law as a result of a city charter change approved 
by the citizens of New Orleans in November of 2008.  This charter change requires that the city 
develop a master plan and that land use action should be consistent with the master plan.   A 
series of public hearings are being held in October 2009 and the New Orleans City Council will 
consider the draft Master Plan in November of 2009. 
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Based on Figure 3, the Master Plan proposal appears to involve a study to remove the elevated 
segment from I-10 Pontchartrain Expressway interchange to the Claiborne Avenue exit.  The 
study area boundaries are not explicitly stated in the plan but reference “removing to St Bernard 
Avenue.”  The Master Plan recommends that the “process of replacing the expressway begin 
with feasibility and environmental impact studies”.    The Master Plan suggests that these 
federally funded studies would begin to determine the cost of “maintaining the aging structure” 
and would address the transportation, economic, social, environmental, and other benefits” of 
demolishing the elevated structure.  The studies would also begin to evaluate the alternatives 
including increased capacity of I-610 to accommodate the rerouted traffic, recapturing the 
historic nature of Claiborne Ave by replacing the tree lined boulevard, providing transit options, 
reuse of newly available lands for housing, recreation and other uses.  The plan also discusses a 
goal of avoiding the need to widen I-610 thus avoiding potential negative impacts to the 
residents in that area.  
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The Master Plan expects that the removal of the I-10 Claiborne Expressway would “right a 
decades-old wrong committed in the name of urban renewal, enhance the livability and character 
of the adjacent neighborhoods like Treme,  promote investment in the neglected blocks along the 
expressway” and begin “restoring historic Claiborne Avenue as a grand tree-lined boulevard.” 
(Goody Clancy, Camiros Ltd, GCR Inc, Maning Architects , 2009, p. 11.24)   
Source: Goody Clancy, Camiros Ltd, GCR Inc, Maning Architects . (2009). New Orleans Master Plan and 
Zoning Ordinance. New Orleans: City of New Orleans. 
Figure 4 New Orleans Master Plan Removal for I-1- Claiborne Expressway 
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Other Articles and Publications 
The Congress for New Urbanism (CNU) ranked the I-10 Claiborne Expressway. fifth out of ten 
“freeways without futures”.  These were urban freeways that have the “opportunity to stimulate 
valuable revitalization by replacing the aging urban highways with boulevards and other cost-
saving alternatives” (Congress for the New Urbanism).  The CNU is a Chicago based, national 
organization that promotes walkable neighborhoods (Cohen, 2008). 
The demolition proposal has been covered by local print media and appeared on the front page of 
the July 12, 2009 edition of the Times Picayune newspaper.  In this article, Mr. Armand 
Charbonnet of the Charbonnet-Labat Funeral Home family, fondly recalls the long ago, shuttered 
Claiborne Avenue businesses such as The Capital Theatre, Labranche’s Drug Store Peoples Life 
Insurance and Two Sister’s Restaurant.  The article also references the ranking of 5th in the 
nation for the CNU listing of freeways without futures.  In a recent article by Lolis Elie in the 
Time Picayune newspaper, Mr. Bill Borah, co-author of the book The Second Battle of New 
Orleans detailing his own activism in the successful defeat of the proposed Riverfront 
Expressway, states that the interstates built in the city “accelerated the exodus to the suburbs and 
it caused cities to be homes for automobiles rather than people.” (Elie, 2009)    
Mr Borah also comments in a March 30, 2009 City Business article that for years he has been 
urging power brokers to “Tear down this monstrosity.” David Waggoner of Waggoner and Ball 
Architects indicated that the primary reason that the removal of the elevated interstate has never 
been seriously considered is that “people of New Orleans seem to be wired to believe that they 
are incapable of successfully tackling large projects.” (Webster, 2009) 
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Approval and Funding of I-10 Claiborne Expressway Removal 
The proposal to remove or demolish the elevated I-10 Claiborne Expressway is in the 
very early stages of the decision making process.  The approval process for public 
roadway and infrastructure projects can be a lengthy, regardless of the outcome.  The 
process that ultimately killed the Riverfront Expressway officially began with the 1946 
Moses proposal and ended in 1969 with then US DOT Secretary Volpe removing the 
project from the interstate system.  That’s over 2 decades.  The process of determining 
the alignment of the Claiborne Avenue interstate spanned nearly 4 years and began with 
the 1954 Major Street Plan. The current alignment was selected following a 1958 public 
hearing in New Orleans.   
Both of these events are in the era before the passage of the 1970 NEPA legislation that 
requires detailed environmental clearance documents such as environmental assessments 
and environmental impact statements, before proceeding with federally funded highway 
construction projects.  The average NEPA approval process took 75 months (or 6.3 years) 
for projects receiving a signed record of decision (ROD) in fiscal year 2008 (Federal 
Highway Administration).  This includes time from the initial notice of intent (NOI) to 
the final FHWA record of decision (ROD). 
Based on an August 11, 2009 interview with Mr. Walter Brooks, Director of the New 
Orleans Regional Planning Commission (RPC), any project involving the Claiborne 
Avenue elevated segment would require federal funding.  The initial process would 
involve the local governing authority, the City of New Orleans, endorsing a plan of action 
such as the Master Plan.  Mr. Brooks indicated that the initial studies to evaluate a 
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demolition proposal and alternatives would need to be funded for inclusion in the 
Uniform Planning Work Program for Transportation Planning (UPWP).  The UPWP 
“describes all federally funded transportation studies being conducted within greater New 
Orleans Transportation Area” for a given fiscal year beginning in July1st and ending on 
June 30
th
.   This study area for the UPWP includes “three urbanized areas (UZAs) - New 
Orleans, Slidell and Covington/Mandeville.” 
The Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development (LDOTD) maintains the 
interstate system and would need to be involved in all decisions regarding the future of the 
elevated expressway.  The LDOTD typically administers the engineering design, contract 
selection and construction of roadway projects involving the interstate system.  The LDOTD 
maintains the Statewide Transportation Improvement Program (STIP) for the state of Louisiana.  
The STIP is “a prioritized listing/program of transportation projects covering a four year period 
that is consistent with the long-range statewide transportation plan, metropolitan transportation 
plans and the Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs) Transportation Improvement Plans 
(TIPs).  In order for a project to be federally authorized for funding it must be included in the 
STIP.” (Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development, 2009)  Any proposal 
regarding the I-10 Claiborne Expressway must ultimately be approved for construction as part of 
the funded projects in the STIP.
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Chapter 3 Policy Implications for I-10 Claiborne Expressway 
There are several pieces of federal legislation that are applicable to transportation 
planning, construction and maintenance which would include the interstate highway 
system as well other transit modes.  Communities now have at their disposal a number of 
legislative instruments that were previously not available during the initial construction 
of the interstate in the 1950’s and 1960s..  These policies will have implications on the 
decisions made regarding the elevated I-10 Claiborne Expressway.    
State and Local Policy Implications 
At the local level, the metropolitan planning organization (MPO) is a major stakeholder in most 
transportation related decisions.  The MPO is regional planning agency formed by federal 
mandate for all urbanized areas (UZAs) with populations of 500,000 or more.  The New Orleans 
area Regional Planning Commission (RPC) includes Jefferson, Orleans, Plaquemine, St Bernard, 
St and Tammany parishes (Regional Planning Commission MTP, 2007; Regional Planning 
Commission TIP, 2008).  The RPC together with the state department of transportation, the 
Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development (LADOTD) have “oversight of the 
Louisiana transportation system” (Regional Planning Commission MTP, 2007, p. 9)  and as such 
would be directly involved in all decision relative to the elevated I-10 at Claiborne.   The RPC 
maintains a 25 year, long range, Metropolitan Transportation Plan (MTP) and a shorter range, 
Transportation Improvement Plan (TIP).  The only project listed involving the I-10 Claiborne 
Expressway is a transportation enhancement project involving landscaping (Regional Planning 
Commission MTP, 2007, p. 35).   
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On November 4, 2008, the citizens of New Orleans approved a amendment to the Home Rule 
Charter to require the city “to prepare a Master Plan to direct its future land development that 
will have the force of law – that is a plan that public officials as well as private citizens will be 
required to follow” and that “all land use regulations- including the zoning ordinance will have 
to be consistent with the plan.” (Borah, 2009, p. 1)   
The September 2009 draft of the Master Plan recommends that the elevated segment of the I-10 
Claiborne Expressway be returned to a tree-lined boulevard.   The plan recommends that the 
initial process begin with a study of “the benefits and costs of replacing the elevated highway.”  
The plan also suggests that the “current elevated highway is in substandard condition and has 
reached a point in its lifecycle where it will require very significant investment.”   The master 
plan and federal law would both require public participation at every stage of the process. 
Federal Policy Implications 
Clean Air Act Links with Transportation 
A gradual policy shift is underway and is promoting a more multi-modal transportation network 
in America with less emphasis on highways and auto transportation. This policy shift is 
beginning to take shape with the passage of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 (CAAA) 
and the Intermodal Surface Transportation Act (ISTEA) in 1991 which “linked transportation 
planning to air quality planning” (Guiliano, 2004, p. 399) since the automobile has been 
identified as a “major contributor of the nation’s air pollution problems” (Hanson, 2004, p. 24).  
Regions not complying with the CAAA air quality standards are required to develop a regional 
transportation plan (RTP) detailing how and when compliance will be achieved.   
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Additionally, a study of disadvantaged populations living near freeway air pollution shed (FAPS) 
concluded that “poor and African-American residents are represented in disproportionately 
higher numbers in FAPS” (Bae, Sandlin, & Bassok, 2007, p. 160), based on data from the cities 
of Portland and Seattle.   The Bae et al study defined a “freeway air pollution shed” as “a 330 
feet buffer from roadways with a minimum of 100,000 vehicles per day” (Bae, Sandlin, & 
Bassok, 2007, p. 159).   The Bae et al study concluded that minority and low income residents 
tend to cluster near freeways and FAPS have a negative relationship to housing pricing after 
considering other factors such as “traffic noise”.  These findings may have applicability to the 
Treme area and the I-10 in terms of similar adverse impacts to health and housing values of the 
area. 
However, in an August 11, 2009 interview with Mr. Brooks of the RPC; he noted that the 
removal of the elevated expressway and replacing with an at-grade boulevard would also have 
air quality implications to the ground level air quality.  Mr. Brooks indicated that moving truck 
traffic to grade level with limited alternate routes would necessitate a review ground level air 
quality.  
ISTEA, TEA-21, SAFETEA-LU and Beyond 
Intermodal Surface Transportation Act (ISTEA) expired in 1997 and was succeeded by 
the Transportation Equity Act of the 21
st
 Century (TEA-21) in 1998.  Like ISTEA, TEA-
21 has continued to provide local and regional planning agencies such as Metropolitan 
Planning Organizations (MPOs) with greater flexibility to use Federal Funding for “all 
surface modes of transportation, including walking, bicycling, and public transit, which 
the planning process has neglected in the past.” (Hanson, 2004, p. 24)   Prior to ISTEA 
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and TEA-21, transportation funding was primarily reserved for highway projects.  TEA-
21 expired in 2003 and was replaced with Safe Accountable Flexible and Efficient 
Transportation Equity Act – A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU) of 2005 which 
continues to broaden the transportation issues particularly issues relating to impacted 
communities being served.  
The United States is at the brink of entering another transportation bill era as SAFETEA-
LU expired on September 30, 2009.  The reauthorization of a new transportation bill has 
not yet been completed by the U.S. Congress, but Congress authorized a 3 month 
extension to the current SAFETEA-LU transportation act.   Congressman James Oberstar 
(D-MN), the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Chairman has introduced a 
$500 billion new transportation bill that is being referred to as the Surface Transportation 
Authorization Act. 
The UNOP and Lambert plans both request that a feasibility study be conducted to 
explore the option of demolishing the I-10 Claiborne Expressway.  Any such study or 
subsequent planning will likely require federal funding under the provisions of 
SAFETEA-LU or its successor legislation.  The study must be included in the UPWP to 
obtain federal funding would be administered by the New Orleans RPC, the MPO for the 
New Orleans area.   
Environmental Justice 
Transportation equity encompasses environmental justice and environmental racism issues such 
as “residential displacement, neighborhood disintegration, environmental and health impacts”, 
and has been expanded to include “employment accessibility, transportation service quality, 
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wage inequality, transit fares and safety issues.” (Sanchez T. a., 2007, p. 95)  In many ways, the 
transportation policies of the past have focused narrowly on the private automobile at the 
expense of poor and minority communities with little or no voice in the decision making process.  
Legislations such as the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969 mandated a review 
of the purpose and need of planned highway projects and a review of alternatives, mitigation 
measures, and mandated public participation in the process.  Additionally, Executive Order No. 
12898 “Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Population and Low-
Income Populations” signed by President William Clinton in February of 1994 raised awareness 
of environmental justice issues by requiring that all Federal agencies address the environmental 
justice issues of their programs that have adverse effects on human health and the environment 
particularly related to minority and low-income populations.    
Community impacts are often examined in the context of environmental justice and equity 
concerns.  These impacts must be examined with regard to the fate of the I-10 Claiborne 
Expressway as the current literature (i.e. post-Katrina) is limited in its review of these issues in 
the context of the recent transportation legislation.  Bullard and Sanchez address the issues of 
environmental justice and environmental equity in transportation planning. (Bullard, 2004; 
Sanchez, Brennan, Ma, & Stoltz, 2007).  Sanchez defines transportation equity as referring “to a 
range of strategies and policies that aim to address the inequities in the nation’s transportation 
planning and delivery system” (Sanchez, Brennan, Ma, & Stoltz, 2007, p. 7).  The RPC TIP 
defines the goal of environmental justice as “to ensure that no communities are sacrificed for the 
good of the others” (Regional Planning Commission MTP, 2007). 
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Other policies specific to transportation equity include National Environmental Policy Act of 
1969 (NEPA), Title VI if the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1970, 
Executive Order No. 12898, US Department of Transportation (USDOT) Order on 
Environmental Justice (DOT Order 5610.2) and the Federal Highway Administration Order to 
Address Environmental Justice (6640.23) (Sanchez, Brennan, Ma, & Stoltz, 2007, p. 73).  NEPA 
requires that any transportation project that is funded with federal dollars must undergo a NEPA 
environmental review to determine if there are any significant impacts to people or the 
environment and to obtain community involvement.  Since any project involving the I-10 
Claiborne Expressway would likely involve federal transportation funds, the projects would be 
subject to the NEPA process.   
The effective application of these policies will be critical to the community’s role in the fate of 
the I-10 Claiborne Expressway.  According to Napolitan, the NEPA process for conducting 
environmental assessments routinely consider the “no-build” alternative, but have not routinely 
or automatically included a “tear down” alternative (Napolitan & Zegras, Shifting Priorities? 
Removal of Inner City Freeways in the United States, 2008).  This dichotomy has application to 
the decision making process for the I-10 Claiborne Expressway because the “tear down” option 
might be one among many alternatives the need to be studied in detail.  
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Chapter 4 Other Impacts for I-10 Claiborne Expressway 
There are a number of anticipated impacts to any decision to demolish or maintain the I-10 
Claiborne Expressway.  Many of these issues were identified following the initial construction of 
the elevated I-10 and will likely continue to be re-evaluated whether or not the I-10 Claiborne 
Expressway is demolished.  The primary impacts discussed herein include community and 
cultural impacts, the impacts of current urban renewal and smart growth philosophies, 
gentrification, the impacts of traffic rerouting and induced demand and post-Katrina priorities.  
Community and Cultural Impacts 
Much has been written about the adverse community and cultural effects that the construction of 
the elevated I-10 Claiborne Expressway has had on the minority community in the Treme area 
(Claiborne Avenue Design Team, 1976; Samuels, 2000; Riker, 2002; Lacho, Parker, & Carter, 
2005; Parekh, 2008; McNichol, 2003; Wright, New Orleans Neighborhoods under Seige, 1997).  
Most notably, the literature repeatedly describes Claiborne Avenue, prior to construction of the 
interstate, as a wide, scenic boulevard measuring 6100 feet long and 100 feet wide from Canal 
Street to St Bernard Avenue with a grassy, oak tree lined median (locally referred to as a neutral 
ground) in contrast to the elevated concrete structure and the cavernous area under the overpass.  
Some of the previous research offered the recommendations for beautification and aesthetic 
improvements of this area (Riker, 2002; Claiborne Avenue Design Team, 1976), but fall short of 
directly addressing mitigation of any cultural and community impacts obtain by implementation 
of a removal or demolition alternative.   
The importance of community involvement in the decision making process for highway projects 
is crucial as indicated in the literature (Mohl, The Interstates and the Cities: Highways, Housing 
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and the Freeway Revolt, 2002; Bullard, 2004; Carlson, Wormser, & Ulberg, Chapter 4 Replacing 
Transportation Blunders with Community-Derived Solutions, 1995; Mohl, Planned Destruction: 
Interstates and Central City Housing, 2000).  Recent transportation legislation has evolved 
beginning in 1991with ISTEA, then TEA-21, and the current version SAFETEA-LU recognizes 
the importance of community involvement and reflects this intent in these legislation (Regional 
Planning Commission TIP, 2008; Regional Planning Commission MTP, 2007). 
Urban Renewal and Current Planning Principles 
Many of the interstate highway construction projects of the 1950’ and 1960’ were touted as 
urban renewal projects.  Highway projects displaced 250,000 persons in New York alone. (Caro, 
1974, p. 19)  The poor and the disadvantaged neighborhoods were disproportionately impacted 
by the construction of the interstate system following the 1956 passage of the Interstate Highway 
Act (Mohl, The Interstates and the Cities: Highways, Housing and the Freeway Revolt, 2002; 
McNichol, 2003, p. 154; Mohl, Planned Destruction: Interstates and Central City Housing, 
2000). 
The sustainability of the current automobile dependent transportation infrastructure in the US has 
been studied widely and is the basis for urban planning perspectives such as Smart Growth and 
New Urbanism (Congress for the New Urbanism; Transportation Research Board, 2002).  These 
planning approaches emphasis reduced automobility, increased walkability, decrease 
environmental impact of transportation and a more balance transportation infrastructure that 
offers a variety of modes of transport. 
The proposed I-10 at Claiborne and the freeway demolitions that have been completed generally 
involve the sustainability issues that attempt to address changing transportation priorities, 
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economic priorities and cultural priorities (Newman & Kenworthy, 1999, p. 27; Napolitan & 
Zegras, Shifting Priorities? Removal of Inner City Freeways in the United States, 2008).   
Hanson defines a sustainable development involves “meeting the current needs in ways that 
improve economic, environmental and social conditions while not jeopardizing the ability of 
future generations to meet their own needs” (Hanson, 2004).  Sustainability is defined as “any 
economic or social development should improve not harm the environment.” (Newman & 
Kenworthy, 1999, p. 1)  In a 1996 journal article, Newman concludes that “support for 
construction and maintenance of freeways is decreased.”  He states that the era of the freeway is 
nearing and end and is no longer sustainable.  He points to the decisions not to rebuild the San 
Francisco freeways impacted by the 1989 earthquake as examples of public “revolts” in favor of 
other options. 
The research by Robert Cervero et al on the removal of the elevated Embarcadero and Central 
Freeways in San Francisco has concluded that the replacement of elevated freeways with surface 
boulevards have resulted in gentrification of neighborhood formerly in decline and can be 
considered a form of “re-prioritization as the transportation planning shifts from automobility to 
“neighborhood quality”.  The Cervero et al research also concludes that combining surface 
boulevards with transit enhancements were effective solutions to preventing the predicted 
gridlock in the aftermath of freeway removal.  Finally, the conversion to boulevards, have urban 
renewal effect of turning the negative “dis-amenity” of living next to a freeway into an amenity 
when converting into a surface boulevard (Cervero, Kang, & Shively, From Elevated Freeways 
to Surface Boulevards: Neighborhood, Traffic and Housing Price Impacts in San Francisco, 
2007; Cervero, Freeway Deconstruction and Urban Regeneration in the United States, 2006). 
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Gentrification 
Gentrification is defined as “Whiter, higher income people moving into predominantly minority 
and lower-income neighborhoods, fixing up house, and driving minorities and lower-income 
people out because of rising housing prices.  New businesses that cater to the new population 
often follow.” (Sanchez, Brennan, Ma, & Stoltz, 2007, p. 166).  Relative to land use in the Treme 
area, gentrification has two perspectives.  One is the contention that gentrification is already 
occurring in the Treme area (Parekh, 2008) and the other is a concern that vulnerable 
communities that may be in support of the expressway demolition may be adversely affected if 
the anticipated increase in property values occurs post demolition and they are no longer able to 
afford to live in the neighborhood (Bullard, 2004, pp. 91-92).   In San Francisco, a 300 percent 
increase in property values is often credited to the demolition of the Embarcadero Freeway 
(Siegel, 2007).   Wright, the Director of the Deep South Center for Environmental Justice, 
expressed concerns related to the impacts of gentrification and increased property values post-
demolition on the African American community (Wright, Director Deep South Center for 
Environmental Justice, 2009).     
Traffic Rerouting, Induced Demand and Reduced Demand 
The demolition proposals acknowledge the need for traffic rerouting should the expressway be 
demolished.  The UNOP plan proposes to reroute traffic via the Pontchartrain Expressway and 
the Lambert plan proposes to I-610 as an alternate route (Lambert Advisory LLC; Zyscovich, 
Inc.; Cliff James; Byron Stewart, 2006; Frederic Schwartz Architects; Eskew+Dumez+Ripple; 
HOK; Wayne Troyer Architects; New Orleans Community Support Foundation, 2007).  The 
UNOP plan speculates that the I-610 and the surface streets could absorb rerouted traffic 
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necessitated by the removal of the I-10 Claiborne Expressway.  The Master Plan states that 
roughly 8 minutes would be added to travel time, if traffic were shifted from the elevated I-10 to 
the I-610.  The Master Plan also envisions that the western I-10/I-610 interchange would need to 
be reconfigured to accommodate eastbound traffic and other capacity improvements to the spans 
of I-10 and I-610 affected by the traffic increase. 
 The traffic count data for I-10 Claiborne Expressway was over 100,000 annual average daily 
traffic (ADT) (Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development) in 2004 prior to 
hurricane Katrina.   Post Katrina, the 2008 traffic count data at most locations along the I-10 
Claiborne Expressway is about 60,000 ADT.  A major concern of any reduction in freeway 
capacity such as the removal of I-10 Claiborne Expressway is the predicted traffic congestions. 
Several studies have shown evidence of the induced demand theory which suggests that 
increasing roadway lanes induces more traffic upon the roadway (Kruse, 1998; Parthasarathi, 
Levinson, & Karamalaputi, 2003).  The converse would be reduced demand following a decrease 
in freeway capacity.  Research suggests that traffic is dissipated due behavioral changes of the 
drivers.  Drivers quickly tend to modify their travel behavior by using alternate routes or 
changing their time of travel away from peak hours (Kulash, 2005).  Kulash also suggests a 
change in the “pattern of origins and destinations” such as homeowners moving to suburbia 
following the expansion of highways and conversely suggests that reductions in capacity will 
prompt reinvestment in inner city neighborhoods.  The Central Freeway removal in 1996 did not 
result in the traffic nightmares that were predicted (Nolte, 1996).   
Cervero’s research on the Embarcadero and Central freeways in San Francisco concluded that 
the freeway removals did not result in traffic havoc” (Cervero, Kang, & Shively, From Elevated 
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Freeways to Surface Boulevards: Neighborhood, Traffic and Housing Price Impacts in San 
Francisco, 2007).   Sally Cairns has also conducted research on the effects of highway capacity 
reductions on traffic that suggest that the predicted traffic congestion following highway 
reductions are overstated (Cairns H.-K. a., 1998; Cairns, Atkins, & Goodwin, 2002).  However, a 
brief article in the satirical online newspaper features an article about the irony of a planner stuck 
in traffic in Pittsburgh as a result of his own anti-freeway projects. The articles states that “the 
city's designers are regularly lauded for their elegant, modern buildings and stuck in traffic of 
their own making for hours at a time.” (The Onion, 2004) 
Post-Katrina Priorities 
The Regional Planning Commission (RPC) is the metropolitan planning organization for the 
New Orleans region and would be actively involved in any funding for studies or other projects 
relative to the fate of the I-10 Claiborne Ave.  As mandated by SAFETEA-LU, the RPC 
maintains a Transportation Improvement Plan (TIP) and a Metropolitan Transportation Plan 
(MTP).  Both of these plans acknowledge the impact of Hurricane Katrina on the transportation 
plans for the region (Regional Planning Commission MTP, 2007, pp. 6-8; Regional Planning 
Commission TIP, 2008, pp. 4-5).    
RPC maintains the long range plan, the MTP, and a short range construction plan, the TIP.  Both 
of these plans are mandated by SAFETEA-LU and previous transportation legislation to be 
“financially constrained to reflect realistic and available levels of funding.” (Regional Planning 
Commission TIP, 2008, p. 3)    The RPC has indicated that a number of projects are currently 
“unfunded mandates” meaning that the NEPA environmental clearance documents for these 
projects have been approved but due to fiscal constraints the project cannot be included in the 
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MTP or TIP. (Brooks, 2009)  These projects and the estimated costs include  “I-49 South 
Raceland to the Westbank Expressway, $5 billion; Earhart Extension West, $250 million; 
Almonaster Bridge $60 million; I-10 West Clearview to Veterans Blvd., $60 million; Harvey 
Canal Bridge Improvements, $50 million.” (Brooks, 2009)  Thus, the I-10 Claiborne Expressway 
removal project would be competing with over $5 billion dollars of currently unfunded 
mandates.  
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Chapter 5 Theory and Conditions  
Relevant Theory 
This research will apply relevant conditions to the I-10 Claiborne Expressway case.  The relevant 
conditions have been obtained from a review of literature.  The experiences of comparative case 
cities will also be utilized to evaluate and analyze the current decision-making process of the 
subject case, the I-10 Claiborne Expressway.   
This research is qualitative and the concept of theory in qualitative research is often thought of as 
the “endpoint” of a study and some qualitative studies “do not employ any explicit theory” 
(Creswell, 2003, pp. 132-133).  It is not likely that the relevant “theories” will necessarily predict 
the outcome of every demolition decision including the decision with regard to the future of I-10 
Claiborne Expressway.  Therefore, I will refer to the selected theoretical framework as 
“conditions” rather than “theories.”   These conditions will guide the collection and analysis of 
data for this multiple case study. 
Napolitan and Zegras Conditions 
Relevant theory on freeway removal is the subject of a research article by Francesca Napolitan 
and P. Christopher Zegras entitled Shifting Urban Priorities?Removal of Inner City Freeways in 
the United States and Napolitan’s master’s thesis with the same title. 
The Napolitan and Zegras research uses a case study of three cities to analyze the growing trend 
of “freeway revolts” of an aging interstate highway system.  The current trend has shifted the 
paradigm from opposition to construction to opposition to the continued existence of interstate 
highways, resulting in “urban freeway removals”.   
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In this research, the authors review three case studies of cities that have grappled with the 
alternative of removing a freeway.  Two of the cities, San Francisco (Central Freeway) and 
Milwaukee, WI (Park East Freeway) chose the removal option.  The third case was Washington, 
DC Whitehurst freeway that was not successful in removing the elevated freeway.  All three 
cases involved elevated interstate highways.  The well-known Boston Central Artery project in 
Massachusetts was not selected because the freeway capacity was restored via a tunnel. 
Napolitan and Zegras concluded that expressway removal takes place only when:  
 a freeways condition raises concerns over integrity and safety, 
 a window of opportunity exists, some event that enables a freeway removal alternative to 
gain serious consideration, 
 the value of mobility is lower than other objectives such as economic development, 
 those in power value other benefits more than they value the benefits associated with 
freeway infrastructure. (Napolitan & Zegras, Shifting Priorities? Removal of Inner City 
Freeways in the United States, 2008)   
Altshuler and Luberoff Conditions 
The book, Megaprojects, The Changing Politics of Public Investment by Alan Altshuler and 
David Luberoff presents common patterns noted in so-called “mega-projects”.  Altshuler defines 
a mega-project as follows: 
“… initiatives that are physical, very expensive, and public.  More specifically, mega-projects 
involve the creation of structures, equipment, prepared development sites, or some combination 
thereof.  They cost at least $250 million in inflation-adjusted year 2002 dollars. …. Mega-
projects are fundamentally an expression of public authority.  The clearest indicator of their 
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public nature since 1920 has been public financing, wholly or in part.” (Altshuler & Luberoff, 
2003, p. 2)  
It is assumed herein that any elevated expressway project would be defined as a “mega-project” 
and hence would be expected to be subject to these common patterns.  However, with the 
exception of the Boston Central Artery case; the cases selected herein do not meet the cost 
threshold for “mega-projects.”   
The common patterns for mega-projects include 
1. “Urban mega-projects ceased to be routine after 1970.”  
2. “Mega-project support coalitions were, with rare exceptions, spearheaded by business 
enterprises with very direct interest at stake.” 
3. “Mega-projects frequently originated in the public sector and were then “sold” to 
perspective constituencies.” This is so-called “public entrepreneurship.” 
4. “…mega-project proposals rarely proceeded to implementation if they imposed more 
than trivial costs on neighborhoods or the natural environment.”  This is so-called “do no 
harm.” 
5. “Even the most sensitively planned mega-projects generated some negative impacts,…. 
widely accepted that these impacts be “mitigated” as far as possible.” 
6. “Though often funded in large part by the federal government, urban mega-projects 
almost invariably originated and drew their main constituency support locally, with little 
if any regard for national purposes.” This is so-called “bottom-up federalism.” 
7. “The central imperative of mega-projects finance was to avoid increases in broad-based 
local taxes…” 
8. “Mega-project cost rose dramatically in the years 1973-2000 and generally exceeded 
official cost estimates at the time of project authorization by a considerable margin.” 
(Altshuler & Luberoff, 2003, pp. 220-221) 
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Conditions 2 thru 6 will be the subject of this study.  The other Altshuler conditions 1, 7 and 8 
were not as salient to the decision making process for freeway removal.   
Condition 1 states that large or mega-projects after were not routine after 1970.  Freeway 
removal is a relatively new phenomenon in urban areas and all the identified cases occurred well 
after 1970.  Even the earliest freeway removal, the Harbor Freeway, in Portland occurred in 
1978.  Thus, this condition will not likely enlighten the research on this subject.   
Condition 7 has public tax implications that I feel would overwhelm or redirect my study toward 
complex issues of taxation that might be better suited for another study.   Condition 8 also has 
cost implications and will not be utilized for this research.  It would be very difficult to perform 
cost comparisons to the New Orleans case because the project scope and official cost estimates 
are not available for the New Orleans case.  However, it is recognized that cost would be a major 
factor in the pursuit of any actions regarding the I-10 Claiborne Expressway.  Available cost data 
is presented in case studies; however, a detailed analysis of cost and tax implications would be 
better suited for inclusion in another study. 
Necessary Conditions for this Research 
Based on the research of Napolitan and Altshuler, nine (9) theoretical necessary conditions have 
been identified.  These conditions are considered common to most “mega-projects” or are 
considered “necessary conditions” for a freeway removal to gain the serious consideration 
needed to actually be undertaken.  For the purposes of this study, these criteria will be referred to 
as “necessary conditions”. 
The UNOP plan also puts forth conditions or hypothesis relative to the removal of the I-10 
Claiborne Expressway.  But upon further review, these are actually “expected outcomes” of the 
48 
removal.  These expected outcomes predict positive impacts of reconnecting neighborhoods  and 
the economic development opportunities of traffic redistribution resulting from a freeway 
removal, but do not address the  “necessary conditions” that must be present for a demolition or 
removal to occur.  Therefore, the UNOP conditions are not included in the “necessary 
conditions” for this study. 
  The “necessary conditions” that are the basis for this research are summarized in Table 1. 
Table 1 Necessary Conditions 
Necessary Condition Definition 
Integrity and Safety Concerns Concerns over integrity and safety of structure. 
Window of Opportunity Some event that enables a freeway removal alternative to 
gain serious consideration. 
Decreased Value of Mobility Value of mobility is lower than other objectives such as 
economic development. 
Power Brokers Value of Freeway 
Less than other Benefits 
Power value other benefits more than they value the 
benefits associated with freeway infrastructure. 
Support of Business Enterprises Spearheaded by business enterprises with very direct 
interest at stake. 
Public Entrepreneurship Originated in the public sector and were then “sold” to 
perspective constituencies. 
“Do No Harm” Principle Not imposing more than trivial costs on neighborhoods 
or the natural environment. 
“Mitigated” Negative Impacts Negative impacts “mitigated” as far as possible.” 
“Bottom-Up Federalism” Main constituency and support are local, with little if any 
regard for national purposes.  May be federally funded. 
Source: Altshuler & Luberoff, 2003; Napolitan, Shifting Urban Priorities: Removal of Inner City Freeways in the United States, 2007  
The selected conditions address the origination or conceptualization of large projects such as an 
expressway demolition which is the focus of my research.  The origination and conceptualization 
of the New Orleans case is being compared to completed the expressway demolition cases.   
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Table 2 Summary of Freeway Removal Cases 
Source: Massturnpike.com, 2006; The Preservation Institute, 2007; Seattle Department of Transportation, 2008; Napolitan, Shifting Urban Priorities: Removal of Inner City 
Freeways in the United States, 2007, Federal Highway Administration.   UNK – information unknown.  NA- not applicable. 
Location Highway Name Elevated 
Nearest Water 
Body 
Traffic 
Count 
(VPD) 
Length 
(mi.) 
Yr.  
Built 
Yr. 
Demo’d 
Acres 
Freed 
Boston, MA 
Boston Central 
Artery  
(I-93) Elevated 
Boston Harbor/ 
Charles River 190,000 3.5 1959 2004 27 
Chattanooga, TN  
Riverfront Parkway  
(State Hwy) No Tennessee River 20,000 
 
1960s 2004 129 
Milwaukee, WI  
Park East Freeway  
(I-43) Elevated Milwaukee River 48,500 0.8 
early 
1960s 2006 26 
New York, NY  West Side Highway Elevated Hudson River UNK UNK 
1929-
1936 
1977-
1989 NA 
Niagara Falls, NY  
Robert Moses 
Parkway no Niagara Gorge UNK 6.5 1961 2001 NA 
Oakland, CA 
Cypress Freeway 
 (I-880) Elevated San Francisco Bay 160,000 1.25 1957 1989 14 
Paris, France  
Pompidou 
Expressway no Seine River 70,000 8 1967 2002 NA 
Portland , OR  
Harbor Drive  
(US Rte 99W) no Willamette River 25,000 2 1942 1978 37 
San Francisco, CA  
Embarcadaro 
Freeway  
(I-480) Elevated San Francisco Bay 100,000 1.2 1953 1991 NA 
San Francisco, CA  
Central Freeway  
(I-80 Spur) Elevated San Francisco Bay 100,000 1.35 1959 2003 2 
Seoul, South Korea  Cheonggye Freeway Elevated 
Cheonggyecheon 
River 168,000 3.6 
1958-
1976 
2003-
2005 NA 
Toronto, Ontario  Gardiner Freeway Elevated Lake Ontario 175,000 1 
1955-
1966 2001 NA 
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Chapter 6 Methodology 
Case Selection Criteria 
This research will involve the use of embedded case studies to support the conclusions drawn 
about the subject case, the elevated I-10 Claiborne Expressway.  The experiences of these case 
cities during the planning and decision making process involving the removal of a segment of 
interstate will be examined.    In an attempt to select cases having relevance to the New Orleans 
I-10 Claiborne Expressway, specific criteria were applied to each potential case.   
The case studies would include highway segments that have been removed, deconstructed or 
demolished.  There are a number of cities that are at varying stages of the planning and proposal 
process for highway removals (see Table 1), but these case studies are limited to those cities that 
have completed the demolition process or as in the case of the Crosstown Expressway have 
reached a firm commitment to demolish a segment of interstate.   
Secondly, the highway segments must be elevated, high speed, limited access highways, 
expressways or freeways, preferably part of the Interstate Highway system.  The terms 
“freeway”, “expressway” and “highway” are used interchangeably for the purposes of this 
document; however the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials 
(AASHTO) maintains official definitions of each term.   
This study is limited to elevated expressways as opposed to at-grade structures.  The replacement 
of elevated expressways with “slower moving at-grade boulevards” has been said to increase 
“access to waterfronts, remove physical obstructions and revitalize economically stagnant 
neighborhoods.”  Elevated expressways also “formed barriers and visual blight, cast shadows 
51 
and sprayed noise, fumes, and vibrations on surrounding neighborhoods.” (Cervero, Kang, & 
Shively, From Elevated Freeways to Surface Boulevards: Neighborhood, Traffic and Housing 
Price Impacts in San Francisco, 2007, pp. 2-3).  The I-10 Claiborne Ave is an elevated 
expressway segment and all comparative cases are elevated expressways for the purposes of this 
study. 
Finally, the cases selected were also a part of the interstate system in the United States as 
opposed to highways in foreign countries such as Gardiner Freeway in Ontario, Cheonggye in 
Korea, Bonaventure Expressway in Quebec or Cahill Expressway in Australia.  The intent was to 
allow direct applicability to policies and trends in America.   
The case selection criteria for this study are summarized as follows: 
 Freeway segments that are elevated. 
 Freeway segments that have been removed or deconstructed. 
 Freeway segments that are a designated part of the US Interstate highway system. 
 
Selected Cases 
Preliminary research identified 12 case cities that have reportedly “demolished” segments of 
limited access expressways as shown in Table 1.  Upon further inquiry, some of these cases do 
not comply with the definition of “demolition” for this research.  For the purposes of this 
research “demolition” will be defined as the permanent removal of an elevated structure from its 
current location.  The definition does not preclude the relocation of the structure or a net 
reduction in freeway capacity. 
The cases for Chattanooga, TN, Niagara Falls, NY, Paris, France, and Portland, OR involve at-
grade expressways instead of elevated expressways.  Thus, these cases were not selected for 
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further study.   The New York Westside highway was not selected as it was not part of the US 
interstate system.  The Seoul, Korea and Toronto, Canada case are not selected because of their 
location in foreign countries, hence they are not part of the US Interstate system.   
The remaining case cities that meet the selection criteria for this case study are as follows: 
 Boston, MA Central Artery (I-93) 
 Milwaukee, WI Park East Freeway (I-43) 
 Oakland, CA Cypress Freeway (1-880) 
 San Francisco, CA Embarcadero Freeway (I-480) 
 San Francisco, CA Central Freeway (I-80 Spur) 
 
These remaining five cases will be utilized to advance this study and its research questions.  The 
information and experiences of these cities will be compared to the subject case, I-10 Claiborne 
Expressway.    
Data Collection 
Data collection for this research was obtained from various sources.  These sources include 
available relevant literature in published books, research documents, newspaper articles, research 
papers and published journal articles.  Some documents were accessed and reviewed in hardcopy 
format and others were accessed electronically via the internet. 
Data and insight was also obtained from personal interviews with Walter Brooks, Director of 
Regional Planning Commission; Keith Scarmuzzo, UNOP District 4 planner with the firm 
Mathes Brierre; and Dr. Beverly Wright, Director of the Deep South Center for Environmental 
Justice.  These individuals provided an oral historical perspective of current, past and future 
impacts to the elevated I-10 Claiborne Expressway.    
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Chapter 7 Boston, MA, Central Artery (I-93) – Case 1 
The Central Artery/ Tunnel project (CA/T) removed an elevated segment of Interstate 93 
(I-93) in downtown Boston, Massachusetts and replaced it with an underground tunnel  as 
part of a larger project known as “The Big Dig”.  The CA/T project is an engineering 
marvel in its scope and execution and is said to be the “largest, most complex and 
technologically challenging highway project in American history” (PBS Online, 2001).  
Source: Massachusetts Department of Transportation 
http://www.massdot.state.ma.us/Highway/images/bigdig/completion_lg.jpeg  
Figure 5 Map of Boston Central Artery / Tunnel Area 
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Construction of Central Artery -1950s 
The Central Artery was a 3.5 mile elevated segment of I-93 that traversed downtown 
Boston near the waterfront of the Boston Inner Harbor and the Charles River in 
Massachusetts.  Construction of the former elevated Central Artery I-93 segment began 
in 1953 and opened to traffic in 1959.   
As the United States was constructing interstates thru urban areas all over the country, the 
Boston area urban area became involved in the “freeway revolt” early.  The public 
opposition of the plans for urban freeways in Boston began in 1953 with the agreement to 
bury a portion of the original Central Artery near Chinatown.  Thus, even before 
construction of the Central Artery was complete in late 1959, officials began to respond 
to organized public opposition and stopped freeway construction for further study that 
resulted in the last leg of the original Central Artery becoming a tunnel. 
Origins of Central Artery Tunnel (CA/T) Replacement Project 
In 1970, about 11 years after the Central Artery was completed, the Governor of 
Massachusetts, Frank Sargent, stopped work on a number of publicly opposed urban 
highways including the proposed Inner Belt that was to run through Cambridge and 
Boston.  Governor Sargent commissioned a “restudy” of transportation plans in the 
Greater Boston area.  This restudy is known as the Boston Transportation Planning 
Review (BTPR).  The final report of the BTPR was issued in 1972 and two projects that 
would become integral parts of the CA/T project were conceived.   One project was a 
tunnel to the Logan Airport and the other involved replacing a segment of the Central 
Artery with an “underground intermittently decked road” (Altshuler & Luberoff, 2003, p. 
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89).  The latter tunnel was originally proposed by Bill Reynolds, a BTPR representative 
of the highway contractors and eventually championed by Fred Salvucci, then a 
transportation advisor to Boston mayor Kevin White. 
Approval and Funding of CA/T Project 
Following the initial conceptual idea for the depression of the central artery 
Massachusetts Governor Sargent and his State Transportation Secretary, Alan Altshuler, 
thought the concept had merits, but they were not ready to attempt to pursue it.   Key to 
this decision was a major fear of gridlock for many years during construction of the 
proposed tunnel (Altshuler & Luberoff, 2003, p. 91).  
In 1974 Dukakis became governor of Massachusetts. Fred Salvucci was appointed State 
Transportation Secretary and continued to champion the CA/T project.  Salvucci initiated 
the process of convincing the FHWA to include the CA/T project into the 1975 Interstate 
Cost Estimate (ICE). 
The inclusion of the CA/T project or any project in ICE was significant because only ICE 
projects could receive federal interstate funding (Altshuler & Luberoff, 2003, p. 93).  The 
federal funding ratio was 90% federal with a 10% state match up until the passage of 
ISTEA in 1991.  Thus, inclusion of the CA/T project in ICE would render it eligible for 
90% federal funding (Altshuler & Luberoff, 2003, p. 97).   Additionally, the federal 
government was obligated to fund ICE projects to completion (Aliosi, 2004, p. 16). 
 The United States House of Representatives majority leader was the late Thomas “Tip” 
ONeill , Jr., a powerful Democratic congressman from Massachusetts. Congressman 
ONeill was instrumental in convincing FHWA to put funding for the CA/T project into 
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the 1975 ICE despite the FHWA contention that the Central Artery was a designated 
segment (i.e. built after the interstate program was enacted) and not eligible for ICE 
funding. 
In 1978 Dukakis was ousted by rival Ed King who did not favor the CA/T but did favor 
the Third Harbor tunnel.  However, the King administration was not capable of 
advancing either the CA/T project or his preferred project, a third tunnel to the Boston 
Logan Airport. 
In 1982, Dukakis was reelected Governor and Salvucci returned as his state 
transportation secretary.  Salvucci refined and expanded his plan to include a burial of the 
entire central artery as opposed to intermittent segments.  In the expanded scope, the third 
tunnel would be from a location in town to a terminus inside the airport, thus eliminating 
disruption of East Boston neighborhoods.   
With Salvucci’s persistence, the project overcame a number of obstacles and adversaries.  
First Salvucci sold the project to Gov Dukakis, then to the business community, to the 
East Boston neighborhood, to environmental groups, and to the Reagan administration 
FHWA administrator Ray Barnhart.  With the continued assistance and support of 
Speaker of the House Tip ONeill (D-MA), the CA/T project was included in the ICE and 
survived every attempt to remove it.    
In 1987, the CA/T project also survived a veto of the omnibus transportation funding bill 
by President Ronald Reagan.   The Reagan veto was overridden by Congress.  However, 
by the time the necessary environmental planning and approvals were secured; 
construction of the CA/T project began after 1991 and was not eligible for historical 90% 
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federal funding.  The enactment of ISTEA brought an end to the 90% federal funding of 
interstate highway projects (Aliosi, 2004, pp. 27-28).   The CA/T project was ultimately 
funded at 58% federal dollars based on a 2002 cost estimate of $14.6 billion dollars. 
(Altshuler & Luberoff, 2003, p. 116)   
Elevated Central Artery Demolished - 2004 
After many years of planning and evolution, the Central Artery/ Tunnel project (CA/T) 
would remove the elevated segment of I-93 in downtown Boston and replaced it with an 
underground tunnel.  This project known as “The Big Dig” included a number of 
roadway and infrastructure improvements, in addition to the replacement of the 
waterfront expressway, known as the Central Artery (I-93).  As shown in Figure 1, the 
other projects included tunnels and bridges such as the Ted Williams Tunnel beneath 
Boston Harbor, the Charles River Bridges, the Massachusetts Turnpike (I-90) extension 
and interchange to Logan Airport via the Ted Williams Tunnel.  Also, included in the 
CA/T projects was the capping and filling of a former city landfill dump known as 
Spectacle Island which has become a public park with a marina, dock for ferry access, 
recreational boats, beaches and picnic areas.  
The northbound and southbound tunnels of the Central Artery were open to traffic in 
March 2003 and December 2003, respectively and were later named the Thomas P. (Tip) 
O’Neill Tunnels in honor of the late Massachusetts Congressman and former Speaker of 
the House of Representatives.   
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Upon completion of the tunnels, the dismantling of the elevated Central Artery 
expressway began in 2004.  For the first time in half of a century, the Boston waterfront 
and North End neighborhoods were reconnected to the downtown.  Another residual of 
the new Central Artery tunnel was the creation of 27 acres of open land in the area where 
the elevated expressway once stood. 
The elevated Central Artery extended from Boston’s North Station south to Chinatown 
and its demolition resulted in an opportunity to redevelop 27 acres of land that was 
divided into over 24 parcels of land shown in Figure 2.  The Land Use Plan proposed in 
anticipation of the newly exposed land from the demolition of the Central Artery and 
replacement with subsurface tunnels dates back to 1991 and was developed by the 
Massachusetts Turnpike Authority (MTA), the agency responsible for the CA/T project 
and tunnel operation.   
Source: Massachusetts Department of Transportation 
http://www.massdot.state.ma.us/Highway/bigdig/bigdigmain.aspx 
Figure 6 Boston Central Artery Redeveloped 
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The “Big Dig” construction began on the Ted Williams Tunnel under the Boston Harbor 
in 1991 and on the Central Artery tunnels in 1996.  The CA/T project took 14 years to 
complete with a total cost estimated to be about $14.6 billion dollars (Road Traffic 
Technology, 2006). 
A Review of “Necessary” Conditions 
Initially, the Central Artery was a six-lane structure designed to accommodate 75,000 
vehicles per day.  The Central Artery traffic had increased to more than 200,000 vehicles 
per day by the early 1990’s and was projected to be 245,000 vehicles per day by 2010.  
Thus, Boston had one of the worst traffic congestion problems in the country with 
commuters regularly spending 8 to 10 hours a day in traffic jam and an “accident rate of 
four times the national average for urban interstates” (Massturnpike.com, 2006).   The 
tunnel has a vehicle capacity of 245,000 vehicles per day versus the former Central 
Artery that was congested beyond its 75,000 per day design capacity (Massturnpike.com, 
2006).   
Unlike the San Francisco freeways, the CA/T project did not involve structural concerns 
due to immediate damage from a natural disaster such as an earthquake.  The traffic 
congestion problems were chronic and evolved over time.  In 1972 when the proposal to 
remove the Central Artery was first released in the BTPR study, the elevated structure 
was only 15 years old and had a number of years of useful life remaining (Altshuler & 
Luberoff, 2003, p. 91).  
The federal funding formula (i.e.90% federal and 10% state) that “inspired” the CA/T 
project “no longer exists.” (Altshuler & Luberoff, 2003, p. 120)  ISTEA and the 
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subsequent 1998 transportation funding bill, TEA 21, did not continue to fund new 
interstate highway projects according to the historical 90% federal formula.   However, 
proponents of the CA/T project strategically timed and structured the project to ensure 
that it was in the ICE which would qualify the CA/T project for federal funding until 
completion albeit at a lower percentage (58%) of federal funding.  
The CA/T project resulted in an increase in lane capacity from 75,000 to 245,000 VPD.  
Thus, there was no apparent decrease in the value mobility, particularly automobility.  
Transit projects that were once a part of the Boston area transportation planning were not 
included in the CA/T projects (Aliosi, 2004, p. 95).  A residual of the CA/T project was 
the unprecedented opportunity to redevelop 27 acres in downtown Boston.  These 
developments included the Rose Kennedy Greenway located in the footprint of the 
former Central Artery and other developments captured in the land use plan.    
Again the power brokers in the Boston CA/T project lead by Governor Dukakis, State 
Transportation Secretary Salvucci, Congressman ONeill and others were not directly 
faced with the dilemma of choosing freeways over other benefits because the freeway 
was in effect replaced by an even higher capacity underground tunnel.  According to the 
study by Napolitan, the CA/T project did not meet the criteria for a “freeway removal” 
because the project did not remove and replace the elevated freeway with an at-grade 
roadway of lower carrying capacity (Napolitan & Zegras, Shifting Priorities? Removal of 
Inner City Freeways in the United States, 2008). 
However, throughout the process of “selling” the project, Salvucci remained committed 
to “one unchangeable principle: not one home would be displaced” (Aliosi, 2004, p. 16) 
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Salvucci systematically obtained the support of the Boston business community by 
exchanging their support of the central artery/tunnel project for the Dukakis 
administration support of the airport tunnel project favored by the business community.  
Salvucci also convinced the business community that the impending deadline for 
submitting environmental documents was critical, that the two projects were only 
effective in tandem and that the new slurry wall technology would greatly minimize 
traffic interruption in the downtown area during construction. The discovery of slurry 
wall technology made the construction of the tunnels possible without first excavating 
which would have closed down the city with severe economic impacts. Salvucci further 
suggested that the central artery was approaching end of life. (Altshuler & Luberoff, 
2003) 
The CA/T project was conceived during the BTPR study commissioned by then 
Massachusetts governor, Frank Sargent.  The actual idea was proposed by Bill Reynolds, 
a BTPR representative of the highway contractors and later kept alive by Fred Salvucci, 
then a transportation advisor to Boston mayor Kevin White and eventually State 
Transportation Secretary to Governor Dukakis.  Mr Salvucci spent a great deal of time 
and effort “selling” the project first to his boss, Gov. Dukakis and then to the many 
business, community, environmental and political stakeholders. 
Unlike the highway projects of the 1950’s that forced removal, relocation and other 
impacts upon residents; the CA/T project committed to ensuring that no residents would 
be displaced by the project.  Additionally, the use of slurry wall technology to construct 
the tunnels allowed the streets above the tunnel to remain open during the construction to 
minimize interruption of the businesses and residents. 
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Nearly one third of the CA/T project budget was dedicated to mitigation issues on behalf 
of the groups affected by the project and maintaining the economic viability of the city 
during construction (i.e. keeping the city open for business).  The mitigation cost just for 
the tunneling under the city was $600 million (Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, 2009). 
The CA/T project was conceptualized by the Boston Transportation Planning Review 
(BTPR) commissioned by then Massachusetts Governor Sargent.  Following the study, 
the subsequent governors aided by the state transportation secretary (i.e Salvucci) were 
instrumental in convincing the federal government to fund the project.  The CA/T project 
was not of national 
The Boston Central Artery project has been touted as one of the most extensive and 
expensive public works project in this century.  The project took nearly 15 years to 
complete at a price tag of $14.6 billion dollars.  Critics of the Central Artery project point 
to the $14.6 billion price tag as too expensive especially since it “more than tripled since 
1987 when Congress approved its financing” even after adjusting cost to 2002 dollars 
(Altshuler & Luberoff, 2003, p. 119) .  Also, the substantial cost overruns also generated 
allegations of corruption during the project construction.   
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Chapter 8 Milwaukee, WI, Park East Freeway (I-43) – Case 2 
Park East Freeway, an elevated structure approximately 0.8 miles in length (Napolitan, Shifting 
Urban Priorities: Removal of Inner City Freeways in the United States, 2007, p. 79), was a part 
of US Interstate 43 (I-43) running through the central business district of Milwaukee, Wisconsin.   
In 2003, the freeway was replaced with an at-grade boulevard, McKinley Avenue, and the street 
grid was restored.  
Source:  Wisconsin Highways 
http://www.wisconsinhighways.org/milwaukee/park_map_parkeast1965. 
Figure 7 Park East Freeway Milwaukee, WI 
 
64 
Construction of Park East Freeway – 1960s 
The Park East freeway opened to traffic in 1971 after construction during the 1960s.  As 
originally proposed, the Park East freeway was a portion of a larger freeway simply known as 
Park Freeway.  The Park freeway is often referred to as Park East and Park West freeways.  The 
Park West segment of the Park Freeway (I-43) was supposed to have a northwesterly alignment 
to the west of the North South freeway.  To the east of the North South freeway was the Park 
East freeway which was to connect to the proposed Lake freeway (Figure 2).  As proposed, the 
Lake freeway was to be a waterfront expressway that ran along the shore of Lake Michigan.  Due 
to public opposition of the planned obstruction of the lakefront began in 1965.  The Lake 
Freeway was cancelled in 1971 and never built.   
Similarly, construction of the Park West freeway was stopped in 1972.  An Environmental 
Impact Statement (EIS) was ordered by US District Judge John Reynolds under the relatively 
new environmental legislation known as the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 
1969.  In January of 1977, the Park West freeway alignment was rejected by the federal 
government based on the EIS. 
With the Park East and Lake Freeways cancelled by 1977, the Park East freeway was destined to 
be “underutilized” because the other connecting segments of the proposed freeway loop were 
never completed.  The Park East freeway was relegated to an incomplete spur carrying 
approximately 54,000 vehicles per day (Seattle Department of Transportation, 2008, pp. 6K-2).  
There were no plans on behalf of state and local officials to complete the proposed Interstate 
loop through downtown Milwaukee and the Park East Freeway “created a visual and physical 
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barrier” between northern downtown and the rest of the city and decreased “ property values on 
surrounding land” (Seattle Department of Transportation, 2008, p. 6K1)     
Origins of Park East Freeway Removal Project 
The cost of repairs for the aging Park West freeway structure was estimated to be in the range of 
$80 dollars in the early 1990s (Napolitan, Shifting Urban Priorities: Removal of Inner City 
Freeways in the United States, 2007).  Led by longtime Mayor of Milwaukee, John Norquist, the 
city began to explore the idea of removing the incomplete spur that was the Park East freeway.   
Mayor Norquist was an influential, veteran, anti-freeway advocate.  Norquist was elected to the 
Wisconsin State Assembly in 1975, the state senate in 1983 and as mayor of Milwaukee from 
1988 to 2004 (Napolitan, Shifting Urban Priorities: Removal of Inner City Freeways in the 
United States, 2007).  Norquist was elected on an anti-freeway platform and continued his anti-
freeway advocacy in all his capacities as a public servant.  Norquist began promoting the idea of 
removing the Park East freeway as soon as he was elected mayor in 1988. 
Approval and Funding of Park East Demolition 
When Norquist took office in 1988, the Park East freeway removal idea began to gain 
momentum.  However, Norquist would have to obtain the support of a number of stakeholders.   
In 1993, Norquist appointed Peter Park as his Planning Director.  Mr. Park was previously 
involved in University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, Architecture Department research into the 
“implications of tearing down urban freeways” and was tasked with “changing the mindset of 
city engineers that capacity should never be reduced.” (Napolitan & Zegras, Shifting Priorities? 
Removal of Inner City Freeways in the United States, 2008). 
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In 1998, Norquist and Park began to formalize efforts to demolish the Park East freeway to make 
available large tract of land for redevelopment with an at-grade boulevard replacing the freeway.  
The City of Milwaukee along with the Milwaukee Redevelopment Corporation and the 
Wisconsin Center District Board contracted A Nelessen Associates to develop a comprehensive 
master plan.  The plan process involved community participation in public workshops.  The 
outcome of these workshops was an overwhelming sentiment that the Park East freeway had no 
future in the new Master Plan for downtown Milwaukee. The master plan identified the freeway 
removal as a key element of revitalizing downtown. (Napolitan, Shifting Urban Priorities: 
Removal of Inner City Freeways in the United States, 2007) 
The master plan process was participatory and became instrumental in securing the support of 
the business community, the residents and relevant government agencies.   
The support of the business community was secured based on a study released by the 
Southeastern Wisconsin Regional Planning Commission (SWRPC) that concluded that the 
demolition of the Park East freeway would not greatly impact traffic congestion or commuting 
times.  Both of which would have had an adverse impact on the business community. 
Then, Governor Tommy Thompson and the Milwaukee County Board of Supervisors began to 
consider supporting the removal of Park East when Harley Davidson, the motorcycle 
manufacturer, expressed interest in locating a museum in the downtown area of Milwaukee.  
The Wisconsin DOT, the City of Milwaukee and the Milwaukee County Board of Supervisors 
conducted Environmental Impact Assessment Study (EA) to look at removal alternatives.  The 
EA included modeling of the traffic flow and concluded that reconnecting to the street grid 
would improve traffic flow. 
67 
In April of 1999, the funding agreement was established between “Mayor Norquist, the County 
Executive of Milwaukee County and the Governor” to use Interstate Cost Estimate funding 
allocated to the State of Wisconsin by the federal transportation funding program ISTEA.  
Shortly before the 1999 deadline for the state of Wisconsin to use or lose the federal funds, the 
state agreed to allocate $25 million of the state $241 million in ICE money to the removal of the 
Park East freeway spur.   The final funding allocation according to the “Letter of Agreement on 
the Allocation of ICE Dollars and on Milwaukee Transportation Projects” ICE provided $21.3 
million and $3.7 million from the local (state, city and county) match for a total of $25 million. 
(Napolitan, Shifting Urban Priorities: Removal of Inner City Freeways in the United States, 
2007) 
Park East Freeway Demolished- 2002 
In June of 2002, the demolition of the elevated Park East freeway began.  The westbound lanes 
were removed first and the eastbound lane was used to move traffic in both directions.  
Subsequently, the eastbound lanes were removed in 2003 and the reconstruction of the city street 
grid took place through to 2004. (Bessert C. J., 2008)
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Source: City of Milwaukee Department of City Development http://www.mkedcd.org/parkeast/update/Projects.pdf   
Figure 8 Park East Redevelopment Area 
 
The Park East freeway area released 26 acres of land for redevelopment.  The city created three 
new neighborhoods called the McKinley Avenue District, the Lower Water Street District, the 
Upper Water Street District.   Each neighborhood is being developed using New Urbanist design 
codes with mixed use developments including residential, office development, and retail.  
Approximately $250 million in investment is expected in the Park East redevelopment area. (The 
Preservation Institute, 2007) 
A Review of “Necessary” Conditions 
The Park East freeway was an aging structure in need of an estimated $80 million of repairs.   
However, there were no imminent integrity or safety concerns associated with the Park East 
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freeway. (Napolitan & Zegras, Shifting Priorities? Removal of Inner City Freeways in the United 
States, 2008)  
The window of opportunity in the Park East case occurred during the tenure (1988 to 2004) of 
Mayor John Norquist who was a veteran anti-freeway activist.  The momentum for removal of 
Park East was accelerated by the City led effort to develop a comprehensive master plan that 
would become the Downtown Master Plan for the city of Milwaukee.  The master plan, with its 
broad input from the residential and business communities, transformed the concept of removing 
the Park East Freeway from an “informal idea pushed by the Mayor to a formal proposal” 
(Napolitan, Shifting Urban Priorities: Removal of Inner City Freeways in the United States, 
2007, p. 85). 
There are a number of indications in the Park East freeway removal case to suggest that the value 
of mobility was diminished relative to other benefits.  Initiated by Mayor Norquist and his 
Planning Director Peter Park, the Park East removal idea soon gained approval of the larger 
public as a vehicle for economic growth and revitalization of downtown.  The business 
community and some government agencies were initially leery of the proposed removal, but the 
interest of the Harley Davidson museum development, the underutilization of the Park East 
freeway,  the success of the East Point Commons development on a former freeway corridor and 
the experience of the San Francisco Embarcadero removal were a few issues that eased concerns 
over the reduction in mobility. (Napolitan, Shifting Urban Priorities: Removal of Inner City 
Freeways in the United States, 2007)     
The support of Mayor Norquist was instrumental in the Park East freeway removal.  He came 
into office with the removal of Park East as a stated goal.  Norquist and Park led the effort to 
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charge to obtain the support and approval of other key governmental bodies such as the 
Governor of Wisconsin, the Wisconsin DOT, County of Milwaukee and Milwaukee city 
engineers.  
The business community was initially fearful of reduced mobility and traffic.  A traffic study by 
the SWRPC was instrumental in securing support of the business community.  The report 
entitled “Analysis of Existing Year 2020 Traffic Impacts of the Termination of the Park East 
Freeway at N. 4
th
 Street and Points East” concluded that the freeway demolition “would have 
minimal impact on traffic congestion.” (Napolitan, Shifting Urban Priorities: Removal of Inner 
City Freeways in the United States, 2007, p. 82)  
The Park East freeway was an idea born locally in the public sector, primarily by Mayor 
Norquist, and sold to the private sector constituency as well as other governmental agencies.  
The major concern for the Park East removal was related to predictions of traffic congestion.  
The 1998 traffic study by SWRPC concluded that the impact to traffic would be minimal.  A 
subsequent study conducted in November 2000 by HNTB on behalf of the Federal Highway 
Administration (FHWA) concluded that the traffic impacts would be even less than the original 
1998 traffic study projections (The Preservation Institute, 2007). 
The Environmental Impact Study and other traffic studies addressed the issue of traffic impacts 
and found them minimal.  The most significant public opposition was led by a downtown 
merchant, Mr. George Watt.  The US District Judge Charles Clevert rule against the plaintiffs in 
the lawsuits filed by Mr Watts regarding air quality and traffic impacts of the Park East removal 
(The Preservation Institute, 2007).  
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The Park East Freeway removal received $21.3 million of the $25 million dollars total project 
cost s from the federal government.  However, the removal of the Park East freeway had no 
major national benefits or implications.  This was another project that was conceived locally then 
sought and received federal funding through legislation such as ISTEA. 
Compared to most freeway removal projects (i.e. the Central Artery in Boston at $14.6 billion) 
the Park East freeway removal was relatively inexpensive at $25 million.  The final cost of the 
removal is projected at $30 million.  Thus, the difference between the initial cost estimate and 
the actual is about a 20% cost increase.  
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Chapter 9 Oakland, CA, Cypress Freeway (I-880) - Case 3 
The Cypress Freeway was a double-deck freeway located in Oakland California.  The Cypress 
Freeway was given the designation of Interstate 880 and was part of the Nimitz Freeway that 
linked to Interstate 80.  The double-deck portion of the Cypress Freeway was an elevated section 
known as the Cypress Street Viaduct with each deck having five lanes of traffic plus ground 
level traffic.     
On October 17, 1989 during the pre-game show for game three of the baseball World Series 
between San Francisco Giants and Oakland As,  the massive Loma Prieta earthquake caused the 
collapse of the Cypress Freeway and 4 forty-two people were killed by the fallen 1.25 mile 
concrete structures.  Ironically, the Loma Prieta earthquake would also damage the Central 
Freeway and the Embarcadero Freeway, in the neighboring San Francisco, California. (Federal 
Highway Administration)    
Construction of Cypress Freeway – 1957 
The Cypress Freeway was constructed to connect the sprawling area of “Alemeda County to 
downtown San Francisco and Oakland’s industrial waterfront.” (Federal Highway 
Administration).  Like many of the freeways constructed in the 1950s, the alignment of the 
Cypress Freeway cut through a predominantly African American neighborhood of West 
Oakland.  The freeway was a physical barrier from the more affluent neighborhoods and the 
“sandwiched” the West Oakland area against the heavy industrial areas of the Port of Oakland.   
The Cypress Freeway carried 160,000 vehicles per day prior to the devastation of the earthquake.   
But, the freeway’s construction displaced 600 families and is blamed for the decline of the 
quality of life in the area (Jackson, 1998). 
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Origins of Cypress Freeway Replacement Project 
Immediately after the earthquake, the California department of Transportation (Caltrans) favored 
an option that would have replaced the freeway in its current location.  However, organized 
opposition to this plan surfaced immediately and the Citizens Emergency Relief Team (CERT) 
formed with the mission of providing a forum for the West Oakland community during the 
rebuilding in the aftermath of the earthquake.   The CERT was supported by several influential 
members such as “a Bay Area Rapid Transit director, a former Port of Oakland CEO, an 
Alameda County supervisor and a former mayor of Berkeley” (Federal Highway 
Administration).  These individuals were versed in policy and capable of influencing it. 
Source: US Department of Transportation Federal Highway Administration 
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/environment/ejustice/case/case5.htm 
Figure 9 Cypress Freeway Old and New Alignment 
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Caltrans presented its proposal in January of 1990 and CERT had already begun to evaluate an 
alternate routes.  The CERT alternate alignment would run be to the west of the current freeway 
route, nearer to the Port of Oakland and some portions would run along the Southern Pacific 
Railroad right-of way.  A small residential area would be impacted by the route, but the vast 
majority West Oakland supported this plan.   
Approval and Funding of Cypress Freeway Replacement Project 
The Cypress Freeway was destroyed during the Loma Prieta Earthquake and the area was 
declared a disaster area by the federal government and state of California.  This declaration 
qualified the Cypress Freeway for “$300 million in immediate relief” (James, St. Onge, van 
Voorst, & Walker).  
The NEPA process involving preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) was 
employed to evaluate the alternative and select a route for the new Cypress Freeway.  Following 
the public comment period for the draft EIS which ended on February 1, 1991, Caltrans selected 
a recommended route from amongst six (6) alternate routes including the existing route.   The 
selected route was west of the existing route and closer to the industrial areas of West Oakland.  
Although, the proposed new route involved over $500 million in land acquisition costs; it was 
viewed as a chance to “reunite West Oakland.”   The level of participation in the decision of 
where to locate the new Cypress freeway was an opportunity to influence the process that was 
not available to the community when the freeway was originally constructed over 30 years prior.  
Cypress Freeway Demolished/ Damaged Beyond Repair – 1989 
The rubble from the collapsed Cypress Freeway was removed in shortly after the 1989 
earthquake.  The newly aligned Cypress Freeway was completely reopened to traffic in 
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September 1998.   In 2002, Caltrans began construction of the Mandela Parkway in the former 
Cypress Freeway right-of-way.  The Mandela Parkway Improvement Project was to create a 
“fully landscaped tree-lined parkway and arboretum on Mandela Parkway in West Oakland.”  
The project is about “18 blocks or 1.3 miles in length, with approximately 14 acres of 
landscaping.” (California Department of Transportation, 2004) 
 
A Review of Necessary Conditions 
A major issue in the fate of the Cypress Freeway was the extensive damage to the structure 
during the Loma Prieta earthquate.  The earthquake forced Caltrans and the West Oakland 
community to decide the location and alignment of a new freeway structure to accommodate 
traffic congestion that resulted from the loss of the cypress Freeway. 
Source: US Department of Transportation Federal Highway Administration 
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/environment/ejustice/case/case5.htm 
Figure 10 Cypress Freeway Damage 
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The earthquake can also be viewed as a huge window of opportunity to redress environmental 
justice issues in the West Oakland community.  Legislation such as NEPA gave this community 
opportunity to legally and formally participate in the decision making process in a way   not 
afforded them during the initial construction of the interstate during the 1950s. 
The Cypress Freeway carried over 150,000 cars daily and was a major artery for traffic in the 
area.  The replacement of the freeway along a new alignment would not be described as a 
decrease in the value of mobility.  The new Cypress Freeway (I-880) has an average annual daily 
traffic (AADT) of over 200,000 vehicles per day (California Department of Transportation, 
2009), thus there was no net reduction in expressway capacity that would be indicative of a 
decreased value of mobility. 
In a process that involved organized public input and opposition; the old freeway alignment that 
was instrumental in the economic decline of the West Oakland neighborhood was replaced with 
a tree-lined at-grade boulevard and the freeway was rerouted through a more industrial area of 
Oakland.  The community in West Oakland quickly capitalized on the window of opportunity 
provided by the 1989 earthquake and began organizing themselves immediately.  Key to this 
organization was the support of power brokers such as the transit director, a former port CEO, a 
county supervisor and a former mayor that formed the CERT.  These individuals teamed with the 
low-income, and minority residents of the area and negotiated several agreements with Caltrans 
that were beneficial to the economic development of the community. 
During the community negotiations with Caltrans, the local business community was awarded 
$90 million in contracts and over 1,000 residents were employed during the reconstruction of the 
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Cypress Freeway.  The business community also enjoys the benefits of a new interchange 
directly to the Port and a Port expansion. 
It appears that the public was immediately in opposition of replacement of the Cypress freeway 
in the old alignment and were not necessarily “sold” on the idea by the public sector.  Caltrans 
was initially focused on replacement of a “crucial link in the East Bay’s freeway network” and 
favored replacing the freeway on its old site.  However, Caltrans responded to the environmental 
justice issues that the community brought forth and effectively considered alternatives that would 
accommodate traffic while addressing community concerns.   
Source: Flickr.com by ucat http://www.flickr.com/photos/ucat/2447326228/ 
Figure 11 Mandela Parkway Development 
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The Cypress freeway’s new alignment is 3.5 miles and is longer than the old alignment (1.25 
miles), but the “the impacts of the Cypress Freeway on West Oakland have been reduced and 
plans for the Mandela Parkway are generating excitement and enthusiasm in West Oakland 
rather than opposition.” (Federal Highway Administration)    Thus, the removal and relocation of 
the physical barrier that was the elevated Cypress Freeway and the conversion of the old 
alignment into a Mandela Parkway was considered a giant step in mitigating negative impacts to 
the area.  The business community also got increased access to the Port of Oakland, residents 
received construction job training funded by Caltrans. 
The Cypress Freeway Replacement project was not largely driven by concerns or benefits on the 
national level.  The new alignment does include more direct access to a port but was not the 
primary impetus for the project.  The freeway was a highly traveled route and transportation 
officials were focused on its replacement, but the selection of a new alignment was driven by the 
local community. 
The replacement of the Cypress Freeway was a very expensive undertaking at a cost $1.2 billion 
and nine years to construct (Jackson, 1998).  Ninety percent of the funding for the Cypress 
Freeway came from federal emergency relief funds triggered by the 1989 earthquake (Jackson, 
1998).  
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Chapter 10 – San Francisco, CA Embarcadero Freeway (I-480) - Case 4 
The Embarcadero Freeway was a double-decker elevated freeway located on the waterfront of 
the San Francisco Bay area of California.  The Embarcadero freeway was given the Interstate 
designation Interstate 480 (I-480).  The original completed design was suppose to connect the 
Bay Bridge to the Golden Gate Bridge in San Francisco, but the construction was never complete 
due to the “freeway revolts” in San Francisco.  In 1959, the revolts led to the San Francisco 
Board of Supervisors cancelling seven of the 10 freeways planned for San Francisco (The 
Preservation Institute, 2007). 
Source: Wikipedia.com 
,http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Embarcadero_Freeway_map.png.  
Figure 12 Embarcadero Freeway San Francisco, CA 
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 After the Loma Prieta earthquake in 1989, the Embarcadero Freeway was closed to traffic due to 
structural damage to the structure.   The freeway was subsequently removed in 1991 and 
replaced with an at-grade boulevard called The Embarcadero.  
Construction of Embarcadero Freeway - 1950s 
Construction began on the Embarcadero Freeway in 1953 following city approval of the Traffic 
Ways Plan in 1951.    In 1956, the newspaper, the San Francisco Chronicle, published a map 
detailing the ten proposed freeways that were planned for the San Francisco area.  The editorial 
opinion of the newspaper was that the citizens waited until it was time for “concrete pouring” to 
begin protesting freeways and further contended that changes to the current plans would have 
been “impossible or extremely costly” (The Preservation Institute, 2007).   
However, the citizen protest became increasingly active and included several influential 
downtown neighborhoods on the waterfront such as Sunset, Telegraph and Russion Hills, 
Potrero, Polk Gulch and Haight-Ashbury (The Preservation Institute, 2007; Cervero, Kang, & 
Shively, From Elevated Freeways to Surface Boulevards: Neighborhood, Traffic and Housing 
Price Impacts in San Francisco, 2007).  These neighborhood groups submitted petitions with 
30,000 signatures to the Board of Supervisors.  In 1959, the Board of Supervisors voted to cancel 
seven of the ten freeway projects including the partially complete Embarcadero and Central 
Freeways.  The efforts of the San Francisco Embarcadero area community is credited as the first 
“freeway revolt” that resulted in the government reversing course and cancelling a freeway 
project. 
The Embarcardero Freeway was never completed as evidence by a stub suspended in the air at 
the point where the freeway would have continued along the waterfront past the Broadway off 
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ramp.  The 1.2 miles of the double-decker freeway that was completed in 1959, carried over 
100,000 vehicles per day (Congress for the New Urbanism).  The freeway would create a 
“physical and visual barrier” between downtown San Francisco and the waterfront for over four 
decades (Seattle Department of Transportation, 2008, p. 6D1).     
Origins of the Embarcadero Removal Project 
Prior to the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake, there were efforts to demolish the partially complete 
Embarcadero Freeway and other San Francisco elevated freeways.  In 1985, the Board of 
Supervisors voted to remove the Embarcadero and replace with a surface boulevard at a cost of 
$171 million of which the city would pay $10 million and the government would pay the balance 
(The Preservation Institute, 2007).  The proposal included an expansion of the trolley system and 
had broad support from the Public Utilities, the Port, the Redevelopment Commissions and the 
sub-committees of the Board of Supervisors, Mayor Dianne Feinstein, and Planning Director 
Dean Marcris.  The proposal also was the subject of a Environmental Impact Report (The 
Preservation Institute, 2007).   
However, initiated by the strong opposition from Supervisor Richard Hongisto and other 
influential residents such as newspaper columnist Herb Caen; the proposal was put to a vote by 
the people.  Two initiative’s were on the ballot.  The Hongisto initiative asked residents should 
the freeway be demolished.  The second initiative asked should the freeway be removed if 
studies determined traffic congestion would be minimal.  Voters rejected both initiatives in June 
of 1986 and effectively killed the freeway removal proposal at that time. 
The 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake was a defining moment in reviving the proposal to demolish 
the elevated, waterfront freeway.  The earthquake caused major structural damage to the 
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Embarcadero Freeway and forced the freeway to be closed.  The predictions of gridlock were 
never manifested except for a brief period.  Commuters effectively used alternate route and other 
modes of transportation (The Preservation Institute, 2007). 
Approval and Funding of Embarcadero Freeway Demolition 
In the aftermath of the Loma Prieta earthquake, the California Department of Transportation 
(Caltrans) proposed three options to address the earthquake damaged freeway that included 
retrofitting the structure, rebuilding a depressed structure or replacing with an at-grade street 
(Cervero, Kang, & Shively, From Elevated Freeways to Surface Boulevards: Neighborhood, 
Traffic and Housing Price Impacts in San Francisco, 2007, p. 8).  After lengthy public debate, 
the majority of residents wanted the freeway demolished which was the most cost effective 
option.  Finally, the opportunity for economic development and revitalization of the area was a 
factor in the decision to demolish. 
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Armed with the proven fact that the closure or removal of the freeway would not result in traffic 
gridlock, the anti-freeway activist began to call for the demolition of the damaged freeway.  In 
April of 1990, the Board of Supervisors voted to remove the freeway structure against the 
opposition of Chinatown merchants who felt that the freeway was a necessary route to bring 
traffic into their businesses. 
Source: Flickr.com http://www.flickr.com/photos/ucat/2447326228/ 
Figure 13 Embarcadero Before and After Demolition 
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Embarcadero Freeway Demolished- 1991 
Two years after the earthquake, the Embarcadero Freeway was demolished in 1991 exposing the 
waterfront to the city again.  The demolition was estimated to cost $3.25 million (Wicker, 1991).  
The cost of redeveloping the Embarcadero Freeway into Embarcadero, the boulevard was $50 
million dollars (The Preservation Institute, 2007).  Since the freeway was primarily located over 
a street (that would become the boulevard), developable land was minimal.  The redevelopment 
of the Embarcadero involve lining with trees, construction of a pedestrian promenade and 
restoration of the historic trolley service using authentic trolley cars obtained from other cities in 
America and Europe.   The property values in the area of the new surface boulevard have 
escalated 300 percent (The Preservation Institute, 2007). 
A Review of Necessary Conditions 
Integrity and safety concerns were a major issue in the decision to demolish the Embarcadero 
Freeway.  The 1989 earthquake severely damaged the freeway structure and caused it to be 
closed after the earthquake.  The city of San Francisco was forced to make a decision to either 
rebuild the freeway or demolish it. 
The 1989 earthquake provided the window of opportunity for San Francisco as the city was no w 
presented with an opportunity to revisit a long standing history of anti-freeway sentiments.  The 
city could actually justify a demolition of the freeway as a cheaper alternative to rebuilding 
elevated or subsurface  
Most of San Francisco agreed that the freeway was a mistake to build.  But as Herb Caen, the 
influential newspaper columnist stated, “tearing down the Embarcadero Freeway” was “an even 
worse idea than building it.” (The Preservation Institute, 2007).  This ideology was a major 
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concern (i.e. Would the city be worse off in terms of traffic and mobility without the freeway?).  
However, the earthquake damage had the effect of causing stakeholders to reevaluate the need 
for the freeway in light of the fact that a retrofit would be among the most costly options.  The 
redevelopment would result in a boulevard with multiple modes of transportation (i.e pedestrian, 
trolley car and automobiles) compared to the previous car dominated freeway transportation with 
no apparent traffic problems. 
As evidence of the broad support for the demolition of the Embarcadero Freeway prior to the 
earthquake, the powerbrokers of San Francisco were beginning to value the waterfront as an 
amenity with huge economic development potential. The residents were not yet on board and 
rejected the pre-earthquake proposals to demolish the freeway.   
Following the earthquake, “some merchants and property owners” wanted “ the Embarcadero 
repaired” and reopened (Wicker, 1991).  The Chinatown merchants were the primary opponents 
to the demolition of the freeway.  The Board of Supervisors voted to proceed with demolition in 
1991 over the objections of many Chinatown merchants who closed their shops to attend the 
meeting.  
Before the earthquake, the demolition proposal presented in 1985 was largely initiated and 
driven by the support of public elected officials such as  implements by public agencies and 
officials such as the Public Utilities, the Port, the Redevelopment Commissions and the sub-
committees of the Board of Supervisors, Mayor Dianne Feinstein, and Planning Director Dean 
Marcris.  An environmental impact report was also completed.  However, when a public official 
who opposed the removal, Supervisor Richard Hongisto, put the proposal to a citizen vote, the 
residents rejected the demolition proposal.    
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The concerns regarding traffic gridlock were ironically addressed by the closure of the freeway 
due to structural damage by the earthquake.  The predicted traffic congestion did not occur, 
therefore this concern was mitigated. The concerns of the Chinatown merchants were not as 
clearly addressed in the literature.  
Again the fears of traffic congestion were the greatest concerns of those in opposition of the 
freeway demolition.  Once the street grid demonstrated that it could absorb the additional traffic, 
the idea of replacing the elevated freeway with a boulevard became the most attractive solution 
that would result in reopening the waterfront to the people.  The removal option was also the 
most economical solution. 
The removal of the San Francisco Embarcadero freeway was of little national significance.  
However, the project was the recipient of federal emergency fund as a result of the earthquake.  
The benefits in terms of economic development were largely benefits to the local economy.  
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Chapter 11 San Francisco, CA, Central Freeway (I-80 spur) - Case 5 
The Central Freeway was an elevated double-decker freeway segment that was partially built 
spur of Interstate 80 (I-80).  The Central freeway was not located directly on the San Francisco 
Bay waterfront like the Embarcadero freeway.  However, the early “freeway revolts” of San 
Francisco did stop the construction of the Central freeway in 1959 (The Preservation Institute, 
2007).  Construction of the freeway was never completed as proposed.  
After the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake and a long approval process, the partially completed 
Central freeway spur was removed and replaced by an at-grade boulevard in 2005.  
Source:  Wikipedia.com http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Central_Freeway_map.png 
Figure 14 Central Freeway San Francisco, CA 
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Construction of the Central Freeway - 1950s 
The Central Freeway was part of a larger 1951 plan for a system of freeways in San Francisco.  It 
was opened to traffic in 1959 which is the year that the San Francisco Board of Supervisors 
cancelled all but three of the ten freeways that were proposed for the city.  The cancelled 
freeways included the partially completed Embarcadero and Central Freeways.    
The Central freeway was located in the Hayes Valley neighborhood of San Francisco and the 
original plan was to extend the freeway at two ends.  To the north past the Civic Center, it was to 
extend through the city and to the Golden Gate Bridge.  The proposed segment turning west at 
Fell and Oak Streets was to be routed through Golden Gate Park and then north to the Golden 
Gate Bridge. 
In the 1960s, freeway planners attempted to again execute the 1951 plans but were defeated. An 
organized group of residents lead by Sue Bierman, a resident of the Haight-Ashbery 
neighborhood and 77 other community groups managed to garner a 6-5 vote of the Board of 
Supervisors against the freeway condition (The Preservation Institute, 2007).  
Origins of Central Freeway Demolition Proposal 
Prior to the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake, there were efforts to demolish the Central freeway.  
The Board of Supervisors passed resolutions in favor of demolishing freeways in 1970, 1980 and 
1985.  Following passage of these resolutions, the necessary “political” and “financial” support 
for demolitions was not realized (Cervero, Kang, & Shively, From Elevated Freeways to Surface 
Boulevards: Neighborhood, Traffic and Housing Price Impacts in San Francisco, 2007, p. 7).  
The Central Freeway carried 100,000 vehicles per day at its peak usage before the earthquake 
(Seattle Department of Transportation, 2008, p. 6C1) 
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Source: Preservenet.com http://www.preservenet.com/freeways/FreewaysCentral.html  
Figure 15 Elevated Central Freeway at Market 
 
Immediately following the 1989 earthquake, the California Department of Transportation 
(Caltrans) demolished the northern-most segment of the Central Freeway due to structural 
damage.  Also in 1996, six (6) blocks of the northern section of the freeway were demolished, 
again due to structural damage (Cervero, Kang, & Shively, From Elevated Freeways to Surface 
Boulevards: Neighborhood, Traffic and Housing Price Impacts in San Francisco, 2007, p. 9).  
The predicted gridlock and traffic jams never materialized when the freeway was closed for 
demolition of the upper deck in 1996 (The Preservation Institute, 2007).  The Central Freeway 
was carrying upward of 80,000 vehicles per day in the 1990s (Cervero, Kang, & Shively, From 
Elevated Freeways to Surface Boulevards: Neighborhood, Traffic and Housing Price Impacts in 
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San Francisco, 2007, p. 10).  These partial demolitions gave the residents of the Hayes Valley 
neighborhood a sense of what the area would look like without the elevated Central Freeway 
structure.  However, the complete demolition of the freeway would be supported by the 
“moderate income Hayes Valley neighborhood” of residents that were not as influential as the 
waterfront residents in the area of the Embarcadero freeway.  The freeway demolition would be 
opposed by “those living elsewhere who regularly used the Central Freeway wanted to rebuild it” 
(Cervero, Kang, & Shively, From Elevated Freeways to Surface Boulevards: Neighborhood, 
Traffic and Housing Price Impacts in San Francisco, 2007, p. 10) 
After the 1996 demolitions, neighborhood leaders, Patricia Walkup, and Robin Leavitt began a 
flyer campaign entitled “Mayor Brown, Tear It Down!” directed at then Mayor Willie Brown 
(The Preservation Institute, 2007). Walkup and Leavitt lead the movement to demolish the 
remaining Central Freeway and were soon joined by Mayor Brown.  Under pressure from the 
western neighborhoods that favors rebuilding the Central Freeway, Mayor Brown pulled his 
support for the freeway demolition.  But, Walkup and Leavitt continued to led the lengthy effort 
to complete the demolition of the remaining freeway.   
Approval and Funding of Central Freeway Demolition 
The approval process for the demolition of the Central freeway continued to be played out at the 
ballot box in a series of conditions for and against the demolition proposal. 
A group called The Coalition to Save the Central Freeway was a key player in getting Condition 
H on the ballot on November of 1997.  Proposition H would have replaced the Central Freeway 
with another single deck elevated expressway.  Proposition H passed. (Napolitan, Shifting Urban 
Priorities: Removal of Inner City Freeways in the United States, 2007, p. 64). 
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In November of 1998, the freeway opponents placed Proposition E on the ballot.  This initiative 
was led by Walker and Leavitt who gained enough signatures to get Proposition E on the ballot.  
Proposition E passed and repealed Proposition H. 
With the debate raging on both sides of the issue, the Board of Supervisors created a Central 
Freeway Project Office (CFPO) to manage the future of the project in March 1999.  The CFPO 
hired a firm, Jacobs MacDonald : Cityworks operated by Allan Jacobs and Elizabeth McDonald, 
to develop a conceptual design and preliminary engineering report for replacing Central Freeway 
with Octavia Boulevard in June 1999.   A second supplemental report of the preferred alternative 
was released in July 1999. (Napolitan, Shifting Urban Priorities: Removal of Inner City 
Freeways in the United States, 2007) 
Even with the city plans and reports complete, the debate continued on both sides of the issue.  In 
November 1999, two competing propositions were placed on the ballot.  Proposition J would 
repeal Proposition E and rebuild the elevated freeway.  Proposition I would removed the freeway 
and replace with an at-grade boulevard.  Proposition I passed and pro-freeway activist opted not 
to continue their opposition.  
The funding for the removal of the Central Freeway was provided in part by $40 million in 
federal Emergency Relief funds after the 1989 earthquake.  Thirteen million dollars were used to 
remove the unstable portions of the Central freeway.  The remaining $27 million was available to 
complete the demolition.  Emergency relief funds, proceeds from the sale of right-of ways and a 
local sales tax were administered by the San Francisco County Transportation Authority on the 
Central Freeway/ Octavia Boulevard Project.  Construction costs are projected to be $25 to $35 
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million. (Napolitan, Shifting Urban Priorities: Removal of Inner City Freeways in the United 
States, 2007, pp. 71-72).    
Central Freeway Demolished- 2003 
The Central Freeway was demolished in 2003 nearly 14 years after the 1989 earthquake (The 
Preservation Institute, 2007).  North of Market Street, the freeway was replaced with an at-grade 
boulevard named Octavia Boulevard which opened in 2005 (Seattle Department of 
Transportation, 2008, p. 6C2).  The “133 feet wide” boulevard has “four lanes for through traffic, 
a landscaped median and two service lanes for slower traffic and bicycles, separated from the 
through lanes by a landscaped median with a sidewalk” (The Preservation Institute, 2007).  The 
Central Freeway was rebuilt south of Market Street, but the Market Street overpass was 
eliminated. 
 
Source: Preservenet.com http://www.preservenet.com/freeways/FreewaysCentral.html 
Figure 16 Market Street Post Central Freeway Demolition 
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There are plans for transit oriented developments including 750 to 900 housing units on the 7 
acres of land released by the freeway demolition (Seattle Department of Transportation, 2008, p. 
6C3).  A new park is located at the northern end of the new boulevard and is named Patricia’s 
Green in honor of the anti-freeway activist, Patricia Walkup, who died in 2006 (The Preservation 
Institute, 2007). 
A Review of Necessary Conditions 
Following the 1989 earthquake, the Central Freeway structure was declared structurally 
compromised and section of the freeway were demolished immediately following the earthquake 
and in 1996. 
The window of opportunity to demolish the Central Freeway was the 1989 structural damage due 
to the earthquake.  The partial demolitions provided momentum for the anti-freeway activist such 
as Walkup and Leavitt.  These anti-freeway activists were countered by organized pro-freeway 
activist who also responded to the partial demolitions with desires to rebuild the freeway. 
Ultimately the partial demolitions gave the Hayes Valley residents values other issues (i.e. 
economic development, quality of life, etc.) more than mobility.  However, Caltrans and 
commuters valued mobility (Napolitan, Shifting Urban Priorities: Removal of Inner City 
Freeways in the United States, 2007, p. 120)  These conflicting values were resolved at the ballot 
box by a series of competing propositions to remove or rebuild the freeway.  In the end, the 
values of the Hayes Valley residents won at the ballot box and the freeway was demolished.   
The power brokers such as the Mayor Willie Brown, the San Francisco Board of Supervisors and 
Caltrans had a role in implementing the will of the people.  Members of the Board of Supervisors 
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tended to side with their constituents (Napolitan, Shifting Urban Priorities: Removal of Inner 
City Freeways in the United States, 2007, p. 120).  The propositions that were put to a popular 
vote played a major role in determining the sentiment of these power brokers and directed them 
on how to proceed.  Both sides, for and against, the freeway removal used the power of the vote 
to further their goals by way of community activist gathering signatures. 
It is not clear if the business community’s support was crucial to the demolition of the Central 
Freeway.  The support for demolition was primarily the Hayes Valley neighborhood and its 
neighborhood leadership, Walkup and Leavitt.   
The Hayes Valley neighborhood was lower income area with a higher percentage of minorities 
relative to the city as a whole (Napolitan, Shifting Urban Priorities: Removal of Inner City 
Freeways in the United States, 2007, p. 112). It was the commuters into the city that were largely 
in support of rebuilding the freeway.   
The Central Freeway demolition was born of earthquake damage that forced a portion of the 
freeway to be demolished due structural integrity concerns.  The proposal to remove the 
remaining freeway segment did not originate in the public sector but was spearheaded by 
neighborhood leaders.  However, the public and elected officials responded to their constituents.  
The San Francisco Board of Supervisors “assumed responsibility for moving the decision –
making process forward” (Napolitan, Shifting Urban Priorities: Removal of Inner City Freeways 
in the United States, 2007, p. 60).  The Board of Supervisors created the CFPO and funded the 
conceptual design and preliminary engineering report for replacing Central Freeway with 
Octavia Boulevard. 
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The demolition of the Central Freeway sparked concerns about traffic congestion and gridlock.  
The city of San Francisco was able to “test” these concerns when the freeway was closed for the 
early demolitions.  The predicted gridlock did not materialize. 
The inadvertent way that traffic impacts were addressed was key to addressing the potential for 
negative freeway removal impacts.  When the freeway was closed following the earthquake and 
no major traffic gridlock occurred, the need for mitigation of traffic concerns was minimized.   
The Central Freeway was originated on the local level and had no significant regard for national 
purposes. 
The Central freeway demolition and surface boulevard construction is estimated to cost between 
25 and 35 million dollars.  No significant escalation of cost occurred over the life of the project.
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Table 3 Summary of Necessary Conditions for Selected Case Cities 
Location - City, State New Orleans, LA Boston, MA Milwaukee, WI Oakland, CA 
San Francisco, 
CA 
San Francisco, 
CA 
Name of Freeway 
Claiborne Ave 
Expressway 
Central Artery/ 
Tunnel 
Park East Freeway Cypress Freeway 
Embarcadero 
Freeway 
Central 
Freeway 
Interstate Designation I-10 I-93 I-43 I-880 I-480 I-80 Spur 
Year Built/ Opened to 
Traffic 
1968 1959 1971 1957 1959 1959 
Year Demolished/ 
Removed 
???? 2004 2002 1989 1991 2003 
Age of Freeway when 
Demolished (yrs.) 
41 
(as of 2009) 
43 31 32 32 44 
Integrity and Safety 
Concerns? 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Window of Opportunity? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Decreased Value of 
Mobility? 
Yes No Yes No Yes Yes 
Power Brokers Value of 
Freeway Less than other 
Benefits? 
No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Support of Business 
Enterprises? 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes NA 
Public Entrepreneurship? No Yes Yes No Yes No 
“Do No Harm” Principle? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
“Mitigated” Negative 
Impacts? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
“Bottom-Up Federalism”? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes. Yes 
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Chapter 12 Analysis and Comparison of Cases to New Orleans I-10 Claiborne Expressway 
Cross Case Analysis of Necessary Conditions 
The proposal to demolish, replace or remove the elevated I-10 Claiborne Expressway is a very 
complex decision that would require a number of years to complete based on the experiences of 
other cities.  The future of this structure is an issue that will eventually need to be addressed as 
the structure continues to age and planning with the force of law raise awareness of the desires of 
the affected communities.   
The elevated I-10 structure was constructed in the late 1960s, a time before the passage of such 
legislation as NEPA (1969), the Clean Air Act (1970), and Executive Orders 12898 (1994) that 
legally mandates the consideration and input of affected citizens. When the I-10 Claiborne 
Expressway was constructed, the social and political climate of the United States did not allow 
the predominantly African-American areas affected to have a voice in the decision making 
process for the interstate structure.  Nor were the impacts to these communities considered to any 
great extent.    
Some support the dismantling, removal or demolition of the elevated structure as reparations of 
sort for the many years that the affected minority community has endured the dis-amenity of the 
interstate highway.  The draft New Orleans Master Plan states that “removal would right a 
decades old wrong committed in the name of urban renewal.” (Goody Clancy, Camiros Ltd, 
GCR Inc, Maning Architects , 2009, p. 11.24)  Most all planners, residents and stakeholders 
agree that a necessary first step in the decision making process would involve feasibility-type 
studies to further explore the possibilities for the future fate of the I-10 Claiborne Expressway. 
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In this research, I have presented five case cities that have completed an elevated freeway 
removal for a segment of the interstate system.  The intent of these cases is to allow for a 
multiple case, cross case analysis of how the decision making process for the I-10 Claiborne 
Expressway case is progressing compared to the experiences of the case cities that have 
completed a freeway removal or demolition.  The hope is that this information will inform the 
ongoing process no matter the outcome. 
The following sections are a summary of the salient points for each of the “necessary conditions” 
that were reviewed for all of the case cities including New Orleans I-10 Claiborne Ave.  These 
points are summarized in Table 3.  An expanded version of Table 3 is included in Appendix 2. 
Integrity and Safety 
The necessary condition of integrity and safety is consistently present in all five of the case cities 
that have demolished elevated interstate segments.  The three cases in San Francisco and 
Oakland California were all brought to the fore by damage from the 1989 Loma Prieta 
earthquake.  The earthquake forced the power brokers and the citizens to re-evaluate the need for 
the expressway in a formal manner.   
The Boston Central Artery project was an issue of safety concerns as the Central Artery was 
designed to carry 75,000 vehicles per day, but was carrying 2 to 3 times its design capacity.  
Thus, the traffic congestion in the Boston area was said to be the worst in the nation. The Park 
East freeway was an aging structure (31 years old) in need of $80 million dollars in repairs. 
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The New Orleans I-10 Claiborne Ave. structure has not been identified as being in need of 
significant repairs nor any other safety concerns based on the TIP and other published planning 
documents. 
Window of Opportunity 
All five of the case cities were provided a definitive window of opportunity.  In San Francisco 
and Oakland cases it was again the earthquake damage.  In Milwaukee, it was the tenure of a 
very determined mayor.  In the Boston case, it was the inclusion of the project in the interstate 
cost estimate (ICE) program that guaranteed federal funding until the project was complete.  This 
combined with strong representation by the powerful Congressman Thomas Tip O’Neill was a 
huge advantage for the CA/T project in Boston.   
The 2005 damage from Hurricane Katrina appears to have ushered in a new era of thinking for 
the citizens of New Orleans.  The post-Katrina planning regularly expressed a desire to begin 
study of the proposal to demolish the elevated structure.  The post Katrina planning and 
rebuilding seems to have been a catalytic event much like the San Francisco earthquakes.  
Although the I-10 Claiborne Expressway structure was not directly damaged by the hurricane, a 
window of opportunity for rethinking the status-quo emerged from the post-Katrina community 
planning.  All demolition proposals originated after the 2005 hurricane and appear to have 
gained momentum as evidenced by the newspaper articles and websites that have written on the 
subject.  It appears that the rebuilding post-Katrina has generated the idea and the Master Plan 
with the force of law will mandate further inquiry.  However, the extent of resources, support 
and funding that the idea will get in the future remains unknown. 
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Decreased Value of Mobility 
In the Oakland and Boston cases, there do not appear to be any decrease in the value of mobility 
as the freeway capacity was moved to a tunnel or shifted to another area of the city.  The 
Milwaukee Park East and the San Francisco Embarcadero and Central freeways all demolished 
and replaced with as lower capacity at-grade boulevards. 
The current proposals in New Orleans appears to represent a decrease in the value of mobility as 
they do not include relocating the freeway capacity, but suggest that the traffic be dispersed to 
the street grid and other local interstate segments with some modifications.    
Power Brokers Value Freeways Less than other Benefits 
In all cases except the Boston and Oakland cases, the power brokers wanted the freeway 
removed to enhance the quality of life of the residents in the area.  In San Francisco cases and 
Milwaukee, there were no plans to restore the freeway capacity in another location of the city.   
However, in the Boston case, the freeway was replaced with a freeway tunnel through the city to 
maintain its growing level of high speed commutes.  Similarly, the compromise in Oakland was 
to relocate the freeway in the industrial area of West Oakland as opposed to the residential area 
of the city, but still maintain the high level of commuters.  It should be noted in both cases that 
issues related to quality of life, economic development and the environment were addressed.  
Both Boston and Oakland created development plans for the parcels of land that were released in 
the former freeway corridor, thus it is not clear that the value of freeways in Boston and 
Oakland, was less than other benefits.  One might argue that they were equally valued by the 
powers brokers.  
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In the New Orleans case, the value of freeways does not appear to be diminished by the powers 
that be.  The freeway removal advocate Bill Borah’s commented that “People looked at me like I 
was crazy.” when he mentioned removal of the I-10 Claiborne Ave (Webster, 2009).  Thus, it 
does not appear that the powers that be have fully embraced the idea and are definitely not 
publicly vocal in support of it.  Most opponents of the idea will cite predictions of major traffic 
congestion as their primary justification. In the San Francisco cases, the predictions of gridlock 
never materialize during the periods when the freeways were out of service due to earthquake 
damage.  In the Milwaukee, traffic studies eased the concerns regarding gridlock and garnered 
support of the removal project.    
Support of Business Enterprise 
Generally, after formal studies or directed persuasion from the powers that be, the business 
community was actively in support of the freeway removal proposal in Boston, Milwaukee, 
Oakland and San Francisco Embarcadero.  In the Central freeway case, the public was a strong 
force in the decision making process with Hayes Valley neighborhood leadership.  A large role 
of the business community is not evident.  In the Embarcadero case, the Chinatown merchants 
were vocal in opposition of the demolition. 
In the New Orleans case, the support of the business community is not clearly established.   To 
date, there has been little documented public support of the idea from the business community 
except some support from professionals in the planning community.  Absent the inadvertent 
freeway outages from the San Francisco earthquakes, the detailed traffic studies in Milwaukee 
were instrumental in garnering the support of the business community.   In the New Orleans 
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case, detailed traffic studies would need to be conducted to garner support from the business 
community.  
Public Entrepreneurship 
The theory that most large projects are conceived by public agencies and “sold’ to the larger 
public constituents is evident in three of the five cases.  In the Boston, Milwaukee and San 
Francisco Embarcadero cases influential public officials such as the mayor, the state 
transportation director and Board of Supervisors.  In the Oakland Cypress Freeway and the San 
Francisco Central freeway cases, the removal idea was largely the imagining of the people of the 
area.  The idea gained momentum and was sold to the public agencies and power structure.  In 
the Oakland case, the people had the early support of influential leaders such as a former transit 
director, a port executive and a former mayor. 
In the New Orleans case, support of public officials has not been vocal or documented outside 
the planning profession and freeway removal advocates like Mr. Borah, who was actively 
involved in the defeat of the Riverfront Expressway proposal in the 1960s. 
Do No Harm Principle 
In every case, the demolition proposal proceeded with a commitment to do no harm to the 
affected areas and to provide enhancements such as the taking of no homes in Boston, job 
training programs in Oakland, or addressing predicted traffic congestion and gridlock in San 
Francisco. 
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Early in the process, the New Orleans proposal has identified potential impacts in the area of the 
Pontchartrain Expressway and surface streets that will absorb the rerouted traffic.  The initial 
proposals have committed to minimizing and mitigating any negative impacts due to the 
anticipated modifications of these infrastructure elements.  
Mitigated Negative Impacts 
Again, all removal cases included mitigation elements in the demolition proposal.  These 
included redevelopment plans for the parcels released from the freeway corridor and traffic 
impact studies.  The Boston project dedicated nearly a third of its budget to mitigation 
agreements. 
The New Orleans case has acknowledged the potential traffic impacts and the reparations to 
historical areas that have been negatively impacted by the elevated structure for over 40 years. 
Bottom Up Federalism 
All projects appear to display “bottom up” federalism whereby projects are undertaken for local 
purposes but are funded in large part with federal monies.  None of the freeway removal cases 
inclusive of the New Orleans case have any major national significance other than interstate 
transport.  These projects were largely the result of local initiatives and discretion on how the 
transit in their cities would be developed or redevelop in accordance to federal program rules.  
There was no major national significance to any of the projects beyond their inclusion in the 
interstate highway system and their eligibility for federal transportation funding.   
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Limitations of this Research and Suggestions for Further Research 
This research is limited in a number of ways.  The proposals for the removal of the I-10 
Claiborne Expressway are new and continually evolving.  There are only a few cities that have 
completed the demolition or removal of an elevated expressway segment.  However, there are 
several cities that are considering the freeway removal option.  Additional research, comparing 
the New Orleans decision making process to the current processes in cities such as Akron, OH, 
Baltimore, MD; Nashville, TN; Rochester, NY; Seattle, WA; and Trenton, NJ have planned or 
proposed freeway removals (The Preservation Institute, 2008) 
Because freeway removal is a new concept and cases are limited, I chose to focus this research 
on a comparison of I-10 Claiborne Ave to cities that have completed a freeway removal.  
However, the Napolitan research identified the Whitehurst freeway in Detroit as a city that 
decided not to remove an expressway after serious consideration of the option (Napolitan & 
Zegras, Shifting Priorities? Removal of Inner City Freeways in the United States, 2008). 
Additional, research on failed attempts to remove an expressway might be warranted. 
The impact of the Master Plan recommendations and the charter change that gives it the force of 
law are not fully known.  The Master Plan is expected to be sent to the New Orleans City 
Council for approval in November of 2009.  If approved the elements of the Master Plan are 
enforceable by law; thus it would seem that further study of the removal option would be 
forthcoming, when funding is identified.  The additional research would need to evaluate traffic 
modeling and impacts, anticipated cost of future maintenance of the structure, benefits of 
maintaining the structure and viable alternatives to the removal option. 
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Post Katrina, the population of New Orleans declined rapidly from 484,674 before the storm to 
311,853 in July of 2008 (U.S Census Bureau News, 2009).  Similarly, the traffic counts for the I-
10 Claiborne Ave. decreased from over 100,000 vehicles per day pre-Katrina to about 60,000 
vehicles per day.  Traffic studies would need to be conducted to determine the roadway capacity 
needed for the projected population growths for New Orleans. 
 This research did not address cost implications of the case cities compared to the I-10 Claiborne 
Ave. as cost projections would be difficult given the scope of this research and the limited details 
regarding the proposed removal options.  A detailed study of the cost versus benefits of the I-10 
structure would be a factor in deciding whether the structure should remain in place or be 
demolished.  Potential funding sources would need to be identified particularly because 
transportation plans that allocate funding are fiscally constrained.   
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Chapter 13 Conclusions 
In conclusion, the necessary conditions for this research were compiled from relevant theory on 
large public projects (i.e. mega projects) and freeway removals.  These conditions are 
 Integrity and safety concerns 
 A Window of Opportunity 
 Decreased Value of Mobility 
 Power Brokers Value Freeways Less and Other Benefits More 
 Support of Business Community 
 Public Entrepreneurship 
 Do No Harm Principle 
 Mitigation of Negative Impacts 
 Bottom Up Federalism 
All conditions were present in the majority of the selected case cities and were unanimously 
consistent across all cases for some conditions (See Table 3).  Thus, these conditions, extracted 
from the relevant literature, appear to have applicability to my research question regarding the 
conditions necessary to reach a decision to remove an elevated expressway in an urban area.   
The current decision making process for the New Orleans I-10 Claiborne Expressway generally 
complies with the necessary conditions in a manner similar to the case cities.  This suggests that 
further inquiry of the removal option is warranted.  The necessary conditions that are not yet 
evident in New Orleans are 1) definitive integrity and safety concerns for the structure, 2) power 
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brokers value of freeways reduced, 3) documented support from business interest and 4) public 
entrepreneurship.  These conditions were present in the majority of the removal case cities.   
The condition of a defined concern for the integrity and safety of the elevated structure is 
common to all removal case cities, but is not present in the New Orleans case.   In the 
Milwaukee case, it was more economical to demolish the underutilized spur than to perform the 
required maintenance.  In the San Francisco and Oakland cases, earthquake damage forced a 
discussion of the future of the expressway.  In Boston, severe traffic concerns from exceeding 
roadway capacity were the justification for a review of alternatives.  Based on this unanimous 
consensus in all cases, integrity and safety concerns must be identified for the I-10 Claiborne 
Expressway removal proposal to obtain further consideration. 
The condition of power brokers value of freeways is not present in the Boston case but is evident 
in all other cases.  The grand scale of the Boston case may render it an exception to the “typical” 
freeway removal case.   Based on the other cases, the I-10 Claiborne Expressway removal 
decision would more likely be implemented with support of a decreased value for freeways and 
an increase in the value of economic development potential of the area. 
The condition of support from the business community is present in all cases, but is not clear in 
the San Francisco Central Freeway case where multiple ballot box initiatives prevailed in 
implementing the will of the people.  Active solicitation of the support of the business 
community bolstered by traffic and mitigation studies, job training and contracting opportunities 
for local business were instrumental in the case cities of Boston, Milwaukee, San Francisco 
Embarcadero and Oakland.  The business community does not appear to be vocal in its support 
of the I-10 Claiborne Expressway.  The I-10 Claiborne Expressway proposal would need to 
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emulate these efforts with the business community to receive serious consideration of the idea to 
remove the elevated structure.  The Master Plan with the force of law, if approved in November 
2009 could provide a legal instrument similar to the ballot box initiatives in the San Francisco 
Central Freeway case.     
The condition of public entrepreneurship where a project is conceived by public agencies or 
elected officials and “sold” to the constituents is not evident in two of the five cases, Oakland 
Cypress Freeway and San Francisco Central Freeway.  This condition is also not present in New 
Orleans as the idea for removal of the I-10 Claiborne Expressway appears to have originated by 
the people of the area during their participation in the planning process.  This may have 
implications for further research as the Oakland Cypress Freeway and the San Francisco Central 
Freeway are located in areas with large populations of minorities and poor people similar to the 
city of New Orleans.  The persistent efforts of neighborhood leaders, constituents and residents 
have resulted in removal of elevated freeway structures. 
The I-10 Claiborne Expressway is proceeding according to the identified necessary conditions 
with the exception of the four conditions described above. The process must address these 
conditions and continue to advance compliance with the conditions that are appear to be evident 
at this stage in the decision making process. 
Based on the findings in this research, the I-10 Claiborne Expressway removal proposal has the 
potential to become a viable option for the future of the elevated structure.  Compliance with the 
missing necessary conditions will be critical to the advancement of the removal alternative 
particularly the commitment of the business community and the values of local power brokers.  
The I-10 Claiborne Expressway case must also quantify the safety and integrity concerns that 
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would justify the removal option.  A fully functioning interstate is not likely to be removed 
without evidence that the cost of maintaining the structure exceeding the benefit of the structure.   
All removal proposals request that a feasibility study be conducted as a first step in the process.  
These studies will generate the data and information regarding the traffic impacts, cost versus 
benefits, and economic development potential of the removal alternative for the aging structure.  
Technical reports and studies were instrumental in obtaining the support of the business 
community and when combined with community support offers a broad base support for the 
removal alternative.  The environmental justice and socio-economic impacts must be clearly 
established in the context of the NEPA legislation and Executive Order No. 12898 and other 
legislation that is protective of minority and low income populations. 
Finally, the I-10 Claiborne Expressway removal will be a lengthy process based on the 
experiences of other cities.  However, the decision making process will need to give serious 
consideration to the removal alternative in any decisions involving future funding for 
maintaining the aging elevated expressway.  This sentiment is clearly expressed by Dr. Wright 
when she stated, “Who would not want that big ugly thing down!” and she further states that 
many issues such as gentrification, and traffic impacts will need to be addressed in the process 
(Wright, Director Deep South Center for Environmental Justice, 2009). 
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Appendix 1 Glossary of Terms 
 
Keyword Acronym Definition 
American Association 
of State Highway and 
Transportation 
Officials 
AASHTO A nonprofit, nonpartisan association representing highway 
and transportation departments in the 50 states, the 
District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. It represents all 
five transportation modes: air, highways, public 
transportation, rail, and water. Its primary goal is to foster 
the development, operation, and maintenance of an 
integrated national transportation system. 
at-grade boulevard  A boulevard that is not elevated. 
Average Annual Daily 
Traffic  
AADT The total volume of traffic on a highway segment for one 
year, divided by the number of days in the year. (Federal 
Highway Administration) 
Central Artery/ Tunnel 
Project 
CA/T The comprehensive project to replace the elevated central 
artery (Interstate 93) with a below grade tunnel. Also 
included several other major projects and is known as the 
“Big Dig”   
Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1990 
CAAA The original Clean Air Act was passed in 1963, but the 
national air pollution control program is actually based on 
the 1970 version of the law. The 1990 Clean Air Act 
Amendments are the most far-reaching revisions of the 
1970 law. The 1990 Clean Air Act is the most recent 
version of the 1970 version of the law. The 1990 
amendments made major changes in the Clean Air Act. 
(Federal Highway Administration)  
Congress of New 
Urbanism 
CNU Chicago based, national organization that promotes 
walkable neighborhoods. (Cohen, 2008) 
deconstruction  Removal by demolition or dismantling of a roadway 
segment. 
elevated expressway   An expressway that is suspended above grade with a 
clearance suitable for passage of traffic and pedestrians 
underneath. 
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Keyword Acronym Definition 
environmental impact 
statement 
EIS A development review document required of federal 
projects under the National Environmental Policy Act to 
assess potential environmental impacts. (Daniels, 2003, p. 
457) 
environmental justice  Ensuring that the effects of transportation planning and 
projects are appropriately and fairly spread throughout the 
communities of all people who live in and visit an area. 
(Sanchez, Brennan, Ma, & Stoltz, 2007, p. 163) 
Equity  Derived from a concept of social justice.  It represents a 
belief that there basic needs that should be fulfilled; that 
burdens and rewards should not be spread to divergently 
across the community, and that policy should be directed 
with impartiality, fairness and justice towards those ends. 
(Sanchez, Brennan, Ma, & Stoltz, 2007, p. 164) 
Executive Order No. 
12898 
 Order signed by President Clinton on February 11, 1994.  
Requires federal agencies to the greatest extent practicable 
and as permitted by law, to achieve environmental justice 
by identifying and addressing disproportionately high and 
adverse human health and environmental effects, 
including interrelated social and economic effects, of their 
programs, policies, and activities on minority and low 
income populations. (Sanchez, Brennan, Ma, & Stoltz, 
2007, p. 80)  
Expressway  A controlled access, divided arterial highway for through 
traffic, the intersections of which are usually separated 
from other roadways by differing grades. (Federal 
Highway Administration) 
Federal Highway 
Administration 
FHWA a major agency of the U.S. Department of Transportation 
(DOT).  As a cabinet-level organization of the Executive 
Branch of the U.S. Government, the DOT is led by a 
presidential appointee-the Secretary of Transportation.  
The top-level official at FHWA is the Administrator, who 
reports directly to the Secretary of Transportation.  FHWA 
is headquartered in Washington, DC, with field offices in 
every State, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico.  
FHWA is charged with the broad responsibility of 
ensuring that America’s roads and highways continue to 
be the safest and most technologically up-to-date. (Federal 
Highway Administration) 
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freeway  A limited-access roadway free of such obstructions as 
traffic lights and railroad closings.  The term may also 
refer to toll -free highway, but some freeways do charge 
motorists, making some freeways toll-ways. (McNichol, 
2003, p. 66) 
freeway  A divided arterial highway designed for the unimpeded 
flow of large traffic volumes. Access to a freeway is 
rigorously controlled and intersection grade separations 
are required. (Federal Highway Administration)  
freeway air pollution 
shed 
FAPS A 330 feet buffer from roadways with a minimum of 
100,000 vehicles per day. (Bae, Sandlin, & Bassok, 2007) 
gentrification  White higher-income people moving into predominantly 
minority and lower-income neighborhoods, fixing up 
houses, and driving minorities and lower-income people 
out because of rising housing prices.  New businesses that 
cater to the new population often follow. (Sanchez, 
Brennan, Ma, & Stoltz, 2007, p. 166) 
highway  Is any road, street, parkway, or freeway/expressway that 
includes rights-of-way, bridges, railroad-highway 
crossings, tunnels, drainage structures, signs, guardrail, 
and protective structures in connection with highways. 
The highway further includes that portion of any interstate 
or international bridge or tunnel and the approaches 
thereto (23 U.S.C. 101a). (Federal Highway 
Administration) 
induced demand  Additions to highways that cause travel to increase. 
(Parthasarathi, Levinson, & Karamalaputi, 2003, p. 1135) 
Intermodal Surface 
Transportation 
Efficiency Act (1991) 
ISTEA Established regional transportation planning through 
Metropolitan Planning Organizations.  Provided $155 
billion in transportation funding. (Daniels, 2003, p. 459) 
interstate highway 
(freeway or 
expressway) 
 A divided arterial highway for through traffic with full or 
partial control of access and grade separations at major 
intersections. (Federal Highway Administration) 
interstate highway 
system 
 The system of highways that connects the principal 
metropolitan areas, cities, and industrial centers of the 
United States. Also connects the US to internationally 
significant routes in Canada and Mexico.  
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Lambert Plan  The New Orleans Neighborhoods Rebuilding Plan 
(NOLANRP), but is commonly given the eponymous title 
the “Lambert Plan”. The funding for this process came 
from $2.9 million in leftover CDBG funds for an earlier, 
pre-Katrina project.  Miami-based housing consultant Paul 
Lambert and Sheila Danzey of New Orleans drew up 
plans for 46 Orleans Parish neighborhoods that were 
significantly flooded by Katrina. (NOLAPlans.com, 2006) 
mega-project  initiatives that are physical, very expensive, and public.  
More specifically, mega-projects involve the creation of 
structures, equipment, prepared development sites, or 
some combination thereof.  They cost at least $250 
million in inflation-adjusted year 2002 dollars. …. Mega-
projects are a fundamentally an expression of public 
authority. (Altshuler & Luberoff, 2003, p. 2) 
 
metropolitan planning 
organization 
MPO 1) Regional policy body, required in urbanized areas with 
populations over 50,000, and designated by local officials 
and the governor of the state. Responsible in cooperation 
with the state and other transportation providers for 
carrying out the metropolitan transportation planning 
requirements of federal highway and transit legislation. 2) 
Formed in cooperation with the state, develops 
transportation plans and programs for the metropolitan 
area. For each urbanized area, a Metropolitan Planning 
Organization (MPO) must be designated by agreement 
between the Governor and local units of government 
representing 75% of the affected population (in the 
metropolitan area), including the central cities or cities as 
defined by the Bureau of the Census, or in accordance 
with procedures established by applicable State or local 
law (23 U.S.C. 134(b)(1)/Federal Transit Act of 1991 Sec. 
8(b)(1)). (Federal Highway Administration) 
Metropolitan 
Transportation Plan 
MTP The official intermodal transportation plan that is 
developed and adopted through the metropolitan 
transportation planning process for the metropolitan 
planning area, in accordance with 23 U.S.C. 134, 23 USC 
135 and 49 U.S.C. 5303. (Federal Highway 
Administration) 
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mitigation  Making changes to a transportation project that will 
correct, eliminate, or alleviate aspects that have 
disproportionate adverse effects on protected demographic 
groups or communities. (Sanchez, Brennan, Ma, & Stoltz, 
2007, p. 184) 
National 
Environmental Policy 
Act 
NEPA Established a national environmental policy requiring that 
any project using federal funding or requiring federal 
approval, including transportation projects, examine the 
effects of proposed and alternative choices on the 
environment before a federal decision is made. (Federal 
Highway Administration) 
neutral ground  Local phrase used in New Orleans to refer to the median 
in a roadway. 
new urbanism  a set of neotraditional design and development principles 
featuring a human scale, walkability, mass transit, 
greenspace, attractive buildings and neighborhoods. 
(Daniels, 2003, p. 461) 
“no-build” alternative   
reduced demand  Removal of freeways causing a reduction in traffic 
demand or “traffic evaporation” (Siegel, 2007) 
Regional Planning 
Commission 
RPC The Regional Planning Commission for Jefferson, 
Orleans, Plaquemines, St. Bernard and St. Tammany 
Parishes, is a 26-member board of local elected officials 
and citizen members, appointed to represent on regional 
issues.  The RPC is the legal entity mandated to promote 
the general welfare and prosperity of the entire region.  
The RPC was created in 1962 by the Louisiana state 
legislature and local governing body authorization. The 
RPC is one of eight regional planning bodies in the state 
established to fulfill federal and state requirements for 
regional comprehensive and economic development 
planning. The RPC is the metropolitan planning 
organization for the region. (New Orleans Regional 
Planning Commission, 2009) 
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Regional 
Transportation Plan 
RTP A 20-year plan drafted by a Metropolitan Planning 
Organization that must be consistent with both the state 
transportation improvement plan and state air quality 
improvement plan. (Daniels, 2003, p. 462) 
 Expressway removal  To demolish or remove a highway from its current 
location without rebuilding in the same location. 
Safe Accountable 
Flexible and Efficient 
Transportation Equity 
Act - A Legacy for 
Users 
SAFETE
A-LU 
Legislation approved by the US Congress in 1005, 
renewing the nation’s highway and public transportation 
laws at a cost of $286 billion over six years. (Sanchez, 
Brennan, Ma, & Stoltz, 2007, p. 88) 
smart growth  A set of planning design principles, regulations, and 
financial incentives intended to combat sprawl by 
promoting more compact development and preserving 
farmlands, forestlands, and natural areas. (Federal 
Highway Administration) 
sustainability  durable; a manageable condition over the long run. 
(Daniels, 2003, p. 463) 
transportation 
enhancement activities 
TE Provides funds to the States for safe bicycle and 
pedestrian facilities, scenic routes, beautification, 
restoring historic buildings, renovating streetscapes, or 
providing transportation museums and visitors centers. 23 
U.S.C. 101(a) and 133(b)(8). (Federal Highway 
Administration) 
Transportation Equity 
Act of the 21st Century 
(1997) 
TEA-21 An act that provided more than $200 billion in federal 
transportation funding. (Daniels, 2003, p. 461) 
Transportation 
Improvement Plan 
TIP A three-year plan, which is essentially an update of the 
Regional Transportation Plan, required under the 
Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act. 
(Daniels, 2003, p. 464) 
Unified New Orleans 
Plan 
UNOP A fourth planning process (post-Katrina) designed to 
avoid the pitfalls of ESF-14, the Mayor’s already stymied 
BNOB, and the Lambert Plan. (NOLAPlans.com, 2007) 
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Unified Planning Work 
Program 
UPWP A document that describes all federally funded 
transportation studies being conducted within the greater 
New Orleans Transportation Study Area during the fiscal 
year period from July 1 to June 30 (Regional Planning 
Commission UPWP, 2008) 
United States 
Department of 
Transportation 
USDOT Establishes the nation's overall transportation policy. 
Under its umbrella there are ten administrations whose 
jurisdictions include highway planning, development and 
construction; urban mass transit; railroads; aviation; and 
the safety of waterways, ports, highways, and oil and gas 
pipelines. The Department of Transportation (DOT) was 
established by act of October 15, 1966, as amended (49 
U.S.C. 102 and 102 note), "to assure the coordinated, 
effective administration of the transportation programs of 
the Federal Government" and to develop "national 
transportation policies and programs conducive to the 
provision of fast, safe, efficient, and convenient 
transportation at the lowest cost consistent therewith." 
(Federal Highway Administration) 
urbanized areas UZAs Area that contains a city of 50,000 or more population 
plus incorporated surrounding areas meeting size or 
density criteria as defined by the U.S. Census. (Federal 
Highway Administration) 
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Appendix 2 Summary of Necessary Conditions (Expanded Table 3) 
Location - City, State New Orleans, LA Boston, MA Milwaukee, WI Oakland, CA San Francisco, 
CA 
San Francisco, 
CA 
Name of Freeway Claiborne Ave 
Expressway 
Central Artery/ 
Tunnel 
Park East Freeway  Cypress Freeway Embarcadero 
Freeway 
Central 
Freeway 
Interstate Designation I-10 I-93 I-43 I-880 I-480 I-80 Spur 
Year Built/ Opened to 
Traffic 
1968 1959 1971 1957 1959 1959 
Year Demolished/ 
Removed 
???? 2004 2002 1989 1991 2003 
Age of Freeway when 
Demolished (yrs.) 
41  
(as of 2009) 
43 31 32 32 44 
Integrity and Safety 
Concerns? 
No.  Imminent 
integrity and safety 
concerns not present. 
Yes. Traffic 
congestion and 
accident data.  
Exceeded design 
capacity. 
Yes. Aging structure. 
Needed $80 million 
in repairs.  No 
imminent concerns. 
Yes. Damaged by 
earthquake 
Yes. Damaged by 
earthquake 
Yes. Damaged 
by earthquake 
 Window of Opportunity? Yes. Post Hurricane 
Katrina proposal 
appears among new 
era of hope. 
Yes. Generous 
interstate funding.  
Inclusion in ICE 
guaranteed federal 
funding that no 
longer exists. 
Yes. Tenure of 
Mayor Norquist. 
Yes. Earthquake Yes. Earthquake Yes. Earthquake 
Decreased Value of 
Mobility? 
Yes.  Demolition 
proposal will not 
replace the I-10 in 
another location.  
Although, will need 
to expand 
Pontchartrain 
Expwy. 
No.  No decrease 
in value of 
mobility.  
Increased 
interstate capacity. 
Yes. Mayor & others 
wanted economic 
growth and 
downtown 
revitalized. 
No. The freeway 
replaced.  No 
decreased value of 
mobility. 
Yes.  Freeway 
replaced with 
multi-modal 
boulevard. 
Yes. Partial 
demolition after 
quake 
empowered 
residents with 
value other 
issues such as 
economic 
development and 
quality of life. 
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Location - City, State New Orleans, LA Boston, MA Milwaukee, WI Oakland, CA San Francisco, 
CA 
San Francisco, 
CA 
Name of Freeway Claiborne Ave 
Expressway 
Central Artery/ 
Tunnel 
Park East Freeway  Cypress Freeway Embarcadero 
Freeway 
Central 
Freeway 
Power Brokers Value of 
Freeway Less than other 
Benefits? 
No.  Power brokers 
are not driving this 
effort.  Idea appears 
to be driven by 
public and planning 
community. 
No, Freeway 
replaced with 
larger 
underground 
structure. 
Yes.  Mayor & others 
lead effort fueled by 
positive outcomes in 
other city that 
removed freeways. 
Yes.  Freeway 
rerouted to more 
industrial area to 
allow for other 
uses and benefits to 
community. 
Yes.  Value of 
waterfront & its 
economic 
potential. 
Yes.  Power 
brokers valued 
will of people 
who began to 
value issues 
other than 
mobility. 
Support of Business 
Enterprises? 
No. Business leaders 
not currently 
promoting the 
demolition idea.  
Yes, Salvucci sold 
idea to businesses. 
Yes. Business 
community supported 
idea after report 
concluded minimal 
negative traffic 
impacts expected. 
Yes. Local 
business 
community 
awarded contracts 
and direct access to 
Port. 
Yes.  Except 
Chinatown 
merchants who 
wanted to keep 
the freeway. 
NA. Walkup, 
Leavitt & Hayes 
Valley Area 
supported 
demolition.  Role 
of business 
community not 
as clearly 
defined. 
Public Entrepreneurship? No.  Community 
planning originated 
removal idea.  Not 
officially supported 
or spearheaded by 
public entities. 
Yes, Idea 
conceived by 
public officials 
and sold to 
constituents. 
Yes.  Idea conceived 
by public officials 
and sold to 
constituents. 
No. Community 
organized 
immediately forced 
public entity to 
consider 
alternatives. 
Yes.  Public 
officials 
supported 
demolition as 
early as 1985, but 
citizens rejected 
at ballot box. 
No.   Idea 
spearheaded by 
neighborhood 
leaders. 
“Do No Harm” Principle? Yes.  All proposals 
identify need to 
miminize impacts to 
communities in area 
of rerouted traffic. 
Yes, Committed to 
no homes 
displaced and kept 
city open during 
construction years.  
Yes. Traffic was 
major concern.  Two 
studies showed 
impacts to be 
minimal. 
Yes.  Job training 
and other 
economic benefits 
to local 
community. 
Yes.  Freeway 
closure due to 
earthquake 
inadvertently 
answered 
congestion 
concerns.  No 
gridlock occurred. 
Yes. Freeway 
closure due to 
earthquake 
inadvertently 
answered 
congestion 
concerns.  No 
gridlock 
occurred. 
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Location - City, State New Orleans, LA Boston, MA Milwaukee, WI Oakland, CA San Francisco, 
CA 
San Francisco, 
CA 
Name of Freeway Claiborne Ave 
Expressway 
Central Artery/ 
Tunnel 
Park East Freeway  Cypress Freeway Embarcadero 
Freeway 
Central 
Freeway 
“Mitigated” Negative 
Impacts? 
Yes. All proposals 
acknowledge the 
need to consider the 
impacts to 
communities 
affected by traffic 
reroute as well as 
reparations to 
historical areas 
impacted by original 
I-10 structure. 
Yes. Mitigation 
agreements were 
nearly one-third of 
project budget. 
Yes. EIS and other 
studies found impacts 
minimal. 
Yes.  New 
industrial 
alignment. 
Replaced with 
Mandela Parkway 
to mitigate years of 
negative impacts to 
the minority 
community. 
Yes.  Major 
traffic impacts did 
not occur when 
freeway was out 
of service.  No 
additional 
mitigation 
needed.  Removal 
option most 
economical 
option. 
Yes.  Major 
traffic impacts 
did not occur 
when freeway 
was out of 
service.  No 
additional 
mitigation 
needed. 
“Bottom-Up Federalism”? Yes, the project was 
of no national 
significance. 
Yes, the project 
was of no national 
significance. 
Yes, the project was 
of no national 
significance. 
Yes, the project 
was of no national 
significance. 
Yes, the project 
was of no national 
significance. 
Yes, the project 
was of no 
national 
significance. 
129 
Vita 
Kim T. Henry is a native of Los Angeles, California, and has resided in New Orleans, Louisiana 
for 29 years.  She received a B.S. degree in Chemical Engineering from Tulane University in 
1984.  Ms Henry is a registered professional engineer (Environmental) in the states of Louisiana 
and Mississippi and has been a practicing engineer for 25 years.  Currently, Ms Henry operates a 
consulting engineering firm in New Orleans, Louisiana. 
